Who in the European Union drives the process of pursuing bilateral trade negotiations? In contrast to societal explanations, this article develops a novel argument as to how the European Commission manages the process and uses its position in strategic ways to pursue its interests. Rooted in principal-agent theory, the article discusses agent preferences and theorizes the conditions under which the agent sets specific focal points and interacts strategically with principals and third parties. The argument is discussed with case study evidence drawn from the first trade agreement concluded and ratified since the EU Commission announced its new strategy in 2006: the EU-South Korea trade agreement.
Investor-state arbitration, also called investment arbitration, is often accused of harming developing states facing economic hardship for the benefit of a wealthy few from the Global North. Its proponents respond that it is the only available means to resolve disputes impartially, and that its increased use clarifies international law. In this article, the authors investigate the empirical manifestations of the uses and functions of investment arbitration, with an original dataset that compiles over 500 arbitration claims from 1972 to 2010. The study reveals that until the mid-to-late 1990s, investment arbitration was mainly used in two ways. On the one hand, it was a neo-colonial instrument to strengthen the economic interests of developed states. On the other, it was a means to impose the rule of law in non-democratic states with a weak law and order tradition. But since the mid-to-late 1990s, the main function of investment arbitration has been to provide guideposts and determine rights for investors and host states, and thus to increase the predictability of the international investment regime. In doing so, however, it seems to favour the 'haves' over the 'have-nots', making the international investment regime harder on poorer than on richer countries.
ABSTRACT. International institutions can help to overcome the problem of supplying goods that are difficult to restrict in terms of consumption. Yet the links between the characteristics of goods, the nature of strategic interaction between actors, and the effectiveness or need for international institutions have not been systematically treated. This article tries to remedy this gap by providing a systematic analysis of the problem of the provision of two types of goods-public goods and common pool resources (CPRs). It starts by examining the characteristics of these goods, and then derives some simple game structures that correspond to different assumptions about the costs and benefits of these goods and variations in actors' capabilities. It then discusses the links between games and institutional solutions. In doing this, the authors are able to encompass previous analytical work and open up new avenues for empirical studies of collective action.
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