No abstract

Perceiving the affordance of a tool requires the integration of several complementary relationships among actor, tool, and target. Highers order affordance structures are introduced to deal with these forms of complex action from an ecological-realist point of view. The complexity of the higher order affordance structure was used to predict the difficulty of perceiving the tool function. Predictions were tested in 3 experiments involving children between 9 months and 4 years old. In a classical tool use task dating back to W. Köhler, a desirable target was obtained by using a hook as a tool. The relative positions of the hook and the target were systematically varied to obtain structures differing in complexity. The observed difficulty of the task was found essentially in accordance with the theoretical complexity of the higher order affordance structures involved in perceiving the tool function.

Despite the acknowledged relationship between consciousness and attention, theories of the two have mostly been developed separately. Moreover, these theories have independently attempted to explain phenomena in which both are likely to interact, such as the attentional blink (AB) and working memory (WM) consolidation. Here, we make an effort to bridge the gap between, on the one hand, a theory of consciousness based on the notion of global workspace (GW) and, on the other, a synthesis of theories of visual attention. We offer a theory of attention and consciousness (TAC) that provides a unified neurocognitive account of several phenomena associated with visual search, AB and WM consolidation. TAC assumes multiple processing stages between early visual representation and conscious access, and extends the dynamics of the global neuronal workspace model to a visual attentional workspace (VAW). The VAWis controlled by executive routers, higher-order representations of executive operations in the GW, without the need for explicit saliency or priority maps. TAC leads to newly proposed mechanisms for illusory conjunctions, AB, inattentional blindness and WM capacity, and suggests neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, the theory reconciles the all-or-none and graded perspectives on conscious representation

Effects of venlafaxine, an antidepressant acting by selective serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibition with a potency ratio of 5:1, were assessed in a standardized, actual driving test, a battery of psychomotor tests (Critical Flicker/Fusion Frequency, Critical Tracking, Divided Attention), and a 45-minute vigilance test (Mackworth Clock). Thirty-seven healthy volunteers, 22 of whom completed the study, received venlafaxine in fixed (37.5 mg twice a day) and incremental (37.5-75 mg twice a day) doses as well as mianserin (10-20 mg three times a day) and placebo according to a 4-period (15 days each), double-blind, crossover design. Testing occurred on days 1 and 7 and after dose increments, on days 8 and 15. Plasma concentrations of venlafaxine and its active metabolite were measured on test days for confirming compliance. Venlafaxine had no significant effect on the primary driving parameter (standard deviation of lateral position) and failed to impair psychomotor performance. Mianserin profoundly and consistently impaired driving and psychomotor performance. However, both drugs significantly impaired vigilance performance. Maximal effects occurred on day 1 with mianserin and similarly on day 7 with venlafaxine in both series. The increment in venlafaxine's dose on day 8 did not increase this effect. The drug's selectively impairing effect on vigilance is shared by other "serotonergic" anxiolytics and antidepressants, suggesting that interference with 5-HT transmission reduces arousal in particularly monotonous tasks or environments. This study concludes that venlafaxine does not generally affect driving ability and should be safe for use by patients who drive.