The government asked the Delta Committee to come up with recommendations on how to protect the Dutch coast and the low-lying hinterland against the consequences of climate change. The issue is how the Netherlands can be made climate proof over the very long term: safe against flooding, while still remaining an attractive place to live, to reside and work, for recreation and investment. ... and its interpretation The task at hand, then, involved looking further than just flood protection. The Committee's vision therefore embraces interactions with life and work, agriculture, nature, recreation, landscape, infrastructure and energy. The strategy for future centuries rests on two pillars: flood protection and sustainability. The report also emphasises the opportunities for Dutch society/ the Netherlands as a whole. water safety Water safety is at the centre of this report, and includes both flood protection and securing fresh water supplies. Achieving water safety prevents casualties and social disruption, while avoiding damage to our economy, landscape, nature, culture and reputation. working together with water 11 Cost Implementation of the Delta Programme until 2050 involves a cost of 1.2 to 1.6 billion euros per annum, and 0.9 to 1.5 billion euros per annum in the period 2050-2100. Coastal flood protection in the Delta Programme is mainly achieved by beach nourishments. If this method is intensified so that the coasts of the Netherlands grow say 1 km in a seawards direction, thus creating new land for such functions as recreation and nature, it will involve an additional cost of 0.1 to 0.3 billion euros per annum.

M arkcting co-operatives (MCs) are analysed from an incompbte contracting perspective. The requirement of the domination of control by the members of an MC is a threat to the survival of an MC in markets where the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is increasing. Howcw~ an MC may remnin an efficient governance stnicture when the increasing h e 1 of asset speciJcity is compensated for by a sufficient increase in the extent of product dijfkrentiation. W George Hendrikse is 3t the Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam School of Management, Office F%51, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Cees Veerman is from Tilburg University, President of the Wageningen University and Research Center. The commeniq by Jos Bijman are gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are ours.' This article is concerned with one-product ctropentives. Many cooperatives in Europe and California are like this. Cooperatives such as those in the Midwest of the United States of America are quite different.' Kreps (1990) classifies econoniic theories according to the assumptions made with respect to the degree of rationality and self-interest orientation. The theory of incomplete contracts is charncterised by bounded rationality and an opportunistic orientation.

The relationship between the financial structure of a marketing cooperative (MC) and the requirement of the domination of control by the members is analysed from a transaction costs perspective. A MC receives less favourable terms on outside equity than a conventional firm because the decision power regarding new investments is not allocated to the providers of these funds. This is a serious threat to the survival of a MC in a market where efficient investments are characterised by an increasing level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production. A MC is predicted to be an efficient organisational form when the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is at a low or immediate level compared to the level of asset specificity at the farming stage of production. 0