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This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as "a non-revolutionary approach" which leaves "the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems." In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny's account of the "scaffolded mind" (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more "revolutionary" metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.

Recent research in cognitive psychology has emphasized the uses, or functions, of autobiographical memory. Theoretical and empirical approaches have focused on a three-function model: autobiographical memory serves self, directive, and social functions. In the reminiscence literature, other taxonomies and additional functions have been postulated. We examined the relationships between functions proposed by these literatures, in order to broaden conceptualisations and make links between research traditions. In Study 1, we combined two measures of individual differences in the uses of autobiographical memory. Our results suggested four classes of memory functions, which we labelled Reflective, Generative, Ruminative, and Social. In Study 2, we tested relationships between our four functions and broader individual differences, and found conceptually consistent relationships. In Study 3, we found that memories cued by Generative and Social functions were more emotionally positive than were memories cued by Reflective and Ruminative functions. In Study 4, we found that reported use of Generative functions increased across the lifespan, while reported use of the other three functions decreased. Overall, our findings suggest a broader view of autobiographical memory functions that links them to ways in which people make meaning of their selves, their environment, and their social world more generally. Memory, 22, th June , available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080June /09658211.2013. NOTICE: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in 3 The Functions of Autobiographical Memory: An Integrative ApproachTheoretical perspectives across a range of traditions have suggested that we use our autobiographical memories to develop a coherent sense of our selves, our emotions, our future plans, and our relationships with other people (Bluck & Alea, 2008;Conway, 2005;Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000;Habermas, 2007;Habermas & de Silveira, 2008;McLean & Pasupathi, 2006(?);Olivares, 2010;Pasupathi, 2006). Because of the rich role of autobiographical memory in daily life, the ways people use their memories is relevant across cognitive (e.g., Conway, 2005), clinical (e.g. Berntsen & Rubin, 2007), developmental (e.g. Kulkofsky, 2011), social (e.g. Beaman, Pushkar, Etezadi, Bye, & Conway, 2007Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1997), and personality psychology (e.g. Habermas, 2007;McLean, 2005). Here, we define function as "reasons for remembering" or "uses of autobiographical memory" or "motivations for remembering", consistent with explicit definitions in the cognitive memory functions literature (e.g. Bluck & Alea, 2011;Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005). That is, we do not necessarily equate function with "adaptiveness", nor make strong claims about the adaptive vs. maladaptive nature of the reasons that people give for thinking about or talking about the past, (although we return to this point and issues with determining "adaptiveness" in the Discussion).The primary aim of the c...