Underlying all theories are philosophical presuppositions that lend themselves to different epistemological approaches, which need to be unfurled when comparing theories and offering alternative explanations. Contrary to Verheggen and Baerveldt's (2007) promulgation that 'enactivism' may be an adequate alternative for Wagner's social representation approach, this commentary outlines how this may be a misguided position.Enactivism, following an outward trajectory from nervous systems, to minds, to '(inter)action', to social enactivism, is incompatible with the dialogical epistemology underpinning social representations theory. Social representations are not reducible to individual minds, and dialogical interaction is not reducible to operationally closed 'systems' in (inter)action. The difference between the two approaches lies in the fundamental paradigmatic distinction between molar and molecular explanatory frameworks. Offering one as an alternative to the other overlooks the epistemological differences between the two and fails to appreciate the discrepancies between different levels of analysis, explanatory frameworks and the very phenomena that theories problematize. We Don't Share! The Social Representation Approach, Enactivism and the Fundamental Incompatibilities between the TwoAs Marková (1982) notes, underlying all theories (be they scientific or 'lay') are certain philosophical presuppositions, implicit or explicit, concerning the nature of 'man', the world and the interaction (or lack thereof) between the two. This is not to suggest there is a 'correct' and 'incorrect' way of studying psychological phenomena; rather, these presuppositions must be unfurled if one is to fully appreciate, and thus critique, the logic of any argument. Such philosophical assumptions Culture & Psychology

This article explores the consequences of discourses of "boundless receptivity to failure" in advanced digital capitalism, as illustrated by the Silicon Valley mantras "fail often" and "safe to fail" on the individual-subject formation. The article highlights issues related to the temporal dimension in grappling with personal experiences of failure-as a transitional moment between past, present and future-by drawing on Hartmut Rosa's theory of the structural modifications of our relationship to time in late modernity, specifically our perception of the "speeding up of life," and its consequences for subjective forms of selfhood. How has the peculiar relationship to temporality at stake in the subject's experience of failure been reshaped by structural modifications of the "materiality of time?" I first argue that the modern-day agenda for fast recovery pathologizes residual emotional attachments associated with the necessary process of "working out a narrative of failure," as explored by sociologist Richard Sennett. This in turn triggers a greater need to "fix" failure through digital technical procedures. Second, I point to a new design model, the "lean principle," as a paragon of structural modifications of the "materiality of time." I show that this new design paradigm, which has been spreading beyond the industrial sector in which it originates to fuel new modes of thinking and subjectivities, strips the experience of failure out from its temporal dimension. Failure can no longer be represented as a temporal rupture between the present and the future. Such a de-temporalized and renewed signification of failure eludes any subjective libidinal engagement in dealing with "unmet expectations" (i.e., failure).

This article draws on Georges Bataille's concept of transgression, a key element in Bataille's theory of the sacred, to highlight structural implications of the way the selfempowerment ethos of new technologies suffuses the digital tracking culture. Pointing to the original conceptual stance of transgression, worked out against prohibition, I first argue that, beyond a critique of new technologies' promise of self-empowerment as coming at the expense of an acknowledgement of the ultimate taboo-death-is the problem of the sanitizing of the tension between the crossing of the line of the symbolic taboo and prohibition; this undermines a "libidinal investment" towards the sacred, which is central in Bataille's theory. Second, focussing on "eroticism", since this embodies the emancipative potential of the Bataillean sacred, I argue that while a fear of eroticism marks out the digital technological realm, this is covered up by the blurring of boundaries between pleasure, fun and sex(iness) that currently governs our experience with technological devices.