Several central banks have begun actively investigating the possibility of issuing central bank digital currency (CBDC). This new central bank liability would be a widely accessible digital form of fiat money, intended as legal tender. This chapter aims to answer a simple question: Does CBDC offer benefits? On the demand side, would it satisfy end user needs better than other forms of money? And on the supply side, would issuing CBDC allow central banks to more effectively satisfy public policy goals, including financial inclusion, operational efficiency, financial stability, monetary policy effectiveness, and financial integrity? In short, is CBDC a desirable form of money given existing and rapidly evolving alternatives? The chapter includes a summary of pilot projects and studies from central banks exploring the possibility of issuing CBDC. The analysis is based on publicly issued materials and discussions with staff members at central banks and technology providers around the world.

DISCLAIMER: Staff Discussion Notes (SDNs) showcase policy-related analysis and research being developed by IMF staff members and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in Staff Discussion Notes are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

The recent fnancial crisis highlighted the role of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in exacerbating the crisis and in transmitting monetary policy beyond the local economy to global markets. Yet, little is known about their behavior, as most models of banking typically focus on banks with a loan desk. We develop a dynamic model of a BHC that encompasses both a trading desk and a loan desk, and explore the role of risk attitude and overleveraging by the trading desk. We trace the impact of monetary policy and market innovations on bank behavior in the presence of Basel III type regulations. To our knowledge, this is a first such exercise. We show that the value of the BHC is enhanced by operating both desks, even if they both are subject to common market shocks. We explore alternative regulatory remedies to ongoing efforts to ring-fence the proprietary trading business, and show that regulations that target bank governance can mitigate possible rogue trading and the overleveraging problem.

A model of lending is presented where loans are established in matches between banks (lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers) who meet in a search process. Projects turn out randomly a quick payoff or a long-term payoff that requires a rollover of the loan. The model generates, under proper parameter conditions, two steady states without or with rollover, and rollover is socially inefficient. Under imperfect information, the standard debt contract is privately efficient. However, it extends the domains of equilibria with socially inefficient rollover. The global dynamics displays a continuum of equilibrium paths that each exhibits sudden discontinuities--crises--in which the mass of outstanding loans is reduced by a quantum amount of terminations. Crises have a cleansing effect

Money, which provides liquidity, is distinct from debt. The introduction of a bank that issues money in exchange for debt and pPolemarchakisays out its profit as dividend to shareholders modifies the model of overlapping generations. The set of equilibrium paths, their dynamic properties, as well as the scope and effectiveness of monetary policy are significantly altered: though low rates of interest are associated with superior steady state allocations, stability of the steady state may require a nominal rate of interest above a certain minimum: without production, a decrease in the nominal rate of interest may result in explosive behavior or convergence to an endogenous cycle, while in an economy with production, an increase in the nominal rate of interest may lead to indeterminacy and fluctuations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006Overlapping generations, Money, Liquidity constraints, Debt, Dynamics.,