Purpose This paper aims to study how audit committee member expertise is related to certain features of the committee and to the audit process. Design/methodology/approach Based on information from 2,477 directors from 296 firms in eight European countries between 2005 and 2014, this study measures average audit committee expertise using a continuous variable, which combines education-based and experience-based expertise. Different measures of the audit process are then regressed against this and other control variables. Findings Average committee expertise has increased in recent years. Education-based and experience-based expertise seem to be complementary. Results also show that committees with greater expertise meet more frequently, have fewer directors with full-time dedication and pay lower audit fees. There is no link to changes in the external firm audit, which may be due to mandatory auditor rotation. Originality/value The paper provides a comprehensive metric of audit committee expertise that includes directors’ academic background, professional experience and qualifications. In addition, this study expands current knowledge concerning whether and how committee expertise affects the audit process.

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This study analyses the association between the competence of audit committee members and earnings management in a sample of 142 non-financial firms from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom over the 2006–2013 period. We measure members’ competence through their dedication and expertise. We find that outside directorships have a dual effect, such that a balanced level of dedication to the audit committee (roughly two outside directorships) reduces earnings management. We examine four types of expertise: audit, non-audit accounting, non-accounting financial, and supervisory expertise. We find a negative relation between earnings management and the audit experience of committee members, and that the other types of expertise play no relevant role. We also find that the contribution of audit experts to curbing earnings management proves particularly important in smaller and less active committees, as well as in smaller and busier boards. Este estudio analiza la asociación entre la competencia de los miembros del Comité de Auditoría y la gestión de los beneficios en una muestra de 142 empresas no financieras de Francia, Alemania, Italia, España y el Reino Unido durante el período 2006-2013. Se mide la competencia de los miembros a través de su dedicación y experiencia. Se descubre que el cargo de consejero externo tiene un efecto doble, de modo que un nivel equilibrado de dedicación al comité de auditoría (aproximadamente dos cargos de consejero externo) reduce la gestión de beneficios. Se examinan igualmente cuatro tipos de experiencia: de auditoría, contable no relacionada con la auditoría, financiera no contable y de supervision, encontrándose una relación negativa entre la gestión de beneficios y la experiencia en auditoría de los miembros del comité, y que los otros tipos de experiencia no desempeñan ningún papel relevante. También se descubre que la contribución de los expertos en auditoría para limitar la gestión de beneficios resulta especialmente importante en los comités más pequeños y menos activos, así como en los consejos más pequeños y más ocupados.