At odds with the large literature devoted to the fiscal discipline effects of fiscal rules, only few contributions investigate their impact on public spending.Estimations based on the entropy balancing method reveal the following causal effects: fiscal rules significantly reduce total public spending and public consumption, leave public investment mostly unaffected, and increase the public investment-to-public consumption ratio. Moreover, the type of fiscal rule and countries' level of economic development influence the way fiscal rules affect public spending. Lastly, fiscal rules' features are a major driving force of the way governments change public spending in the presence of fiscal rules.

This paper shows that, contrary to their favourable effect in the EU non-FCC (Former Communist Countries), fiscal rules do not significantly affect fiscal performance in the group of EU FCC. This finding, which may echo differences between FCC and other EU inherited from the Cold War period, is robust when considering various estimation methods, dividing fiscal rules along various dimensions, and using several observed and computed measures of fiscal performance. However, when going beyond the simple presence of fiscal rules, we find that an improvement of the strength of fiscal rules significantly affects fiscal performance in EU FCC, with a magnitude higher than that in EU non-FCC. Our findings are particularly important from the perspective of the future Euro zone and European Union enlargements, which involve former communist countries, and go along with the adoption of various types of fiscal rules.

We estimate the effect of sovereign credit rating events on the foreign exchange market. Using entropy balancing—a treatment effect methodology that properly addresses the possible self‐selection and endogeneity biases related to rating events—we find robust evidence that a positive (negative) sovereign credit rating event significantly increases (decreases) on average exchange rates, with a larger magnitude for negative events. This effect remains significant under flexible (but not under fixed) exchange rate regimes, and displays asymmetries related to the size of the rating event: in particular, only negative large (i.e., above one notch) rating events trigger a significant response of exchange rates. Lastly, we unveil important nonlinearities related to the initial value of the rating, suggesting a possible amplification mechanism: the impact of positive (negative) rating events is stronger in absolute value if ratings are initially high (low).