No abstract

Audit report lag (ARL) is the length of time from a company's fiscal year-end to the audit report date, and is often viewed as the most important financial reporting timeliness determinant. Given that timeliness is an area of interest to investors, managers, regulators, auditors and academics, an understanding of ARL determinants is extremely important. As financial markets become more globally oriented, an international understanding of ARL determinants becomes even more important. This paper summarizes the extant literature on ARL and its determinants with an emphasis on international literature. Our review categorizes prior research based on company-specific and auditrelated factors, and explores the associations that have been identified with respect to ARL. Finally, we identify possible areas of interest not currently present in the literature and speculate on several opportunities for future research.

SUMMARY Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) allows external auditors (EAs) to rely on the internal audit function (IAF) when the internal audit activities meet certain criteria and the EAs would find efficiencies in relying on their work (PCAOB 2007). This paper reviews the extant literature on the EAs' reliance on IAF, identifies gaps in the literature, and proposes a series of research questions aimed at closing these gaps. We focus our review on research pertaining to how environmental factors and IAF-specific factors influence initial EAs' reliance decisions, the nature and extent of EAs' reliance on IAF, and the observable outcomes as a result of EAs' reliance decisions. Our review finds that the environment in which EAs must make a reliance decision is complex—involving several factors that must be considered simultaneously. Moreover, an evolving set of auditing standards introduces several necessary intermediary judgments that the EAs must process before, and during, reliance on the IAF. In addition, our review indicates that we continue to know very little about how, and to what extent, EAs are currently evaluating IAF's quality factors. Similarly, while we find that the nature and extent of EAs' reliance on IAF is influenced by account risk, inherent risk, and IAF sourcing, how the EAs choose task environments (e.g., revenue recognition versus payroll), and the types of tests to be relied upon within these task environments, is not completely understood. Finally, we find that there is a paucity of research concerning the effects of EAs' reliance on IAF in terms of external audit quality.

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) encourages external auditors to rely on internal auditors to increase the efficiency of lower-risk internal control evaluations (PCAOB 2007). We use post-SOX experimental data to compare the levels and effects of employer (client) identification on the control evaluations of internal (external) auditors. First, we find that internal auditors perceive a greater level of identification with the evaluated firm than do external auditors. We also find some evidence that, ceteris paribus, internal auditors are less lenient than external auditors when evaluating internal control deficiencies (i.e., tend to support management's preferred position to a lesser extent). Further, while we support Bamber and Iyer's (2007) results by finding that higher levels of external auditor client identification are associated with more lenient control evaluations, we demonstrate an opposite effect for internal auditors—higher levels of internal auditor employer identification are associated with less lenient control evaluations. Our results are important because we are the first to capture the relative levels of identification between internal and external auditors, as well as the first to compare directly internal and external auditor leniency, both of which are important in light of AS5. That is, we provide initial evidence that external auditors' increased reliance on internal auditors' work, while increasing audit efficiency, also could improve audit quality by resulting in less lenient internal control evaluations, due, at least in part, to the effects of employer and client identification. Data Availability: Contact the first author.

SYNOPSIS This study reports the results of a survey of 107 audit partners from large public accounting firms that investigates and compares partner perceptions of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections' and Internal Quality Reviews (IQRs): (1) predictability, (2) conduct, (3) reviewer qualifications and behavior, and (4) effects (i.e., on audits, partners, and firms). A majority of partners can or try to predict the year of both reviews and perceive that, relative to PCAOB inspections, IQR reviewers have a better understanding of firms' audit methodologies, IQRs focus more on whether firms follow their methodology, and IQRs examine more audit areas. In addition, partners believe that PCAOB inspectors are more focused on finding deficiencies than are IQR reviewers, and that IQR feedback is more timely and helpful for improving audit quality. Both reviews are perceived to impact professional reputation; however, partners perceive that PCAOB inspections increase their firms' litigation risk more so than do IQRs. Finally, less experienced partners perceive reviews as more invasive and as posing more consequences than do more experienced partners. We provide credible, informed perceptions of partners directly involved in both PCAOB inspections and IQRs (which heretofore have not been examined directly by practitioner or academic research) that should be beneficial to accounting researchers, practicing auditors, and regulatory bodies interested in understanding the perceived effects and effectiveness of PCAOB inspections and IQRs.