Many commentators contend that the Chinese government adopted an incremental approach to welfare policy reform because its leaders lacked an overall blueprint for it, allowing initiatives to be implemented only after lengthy experimentation. While this perspective has provided an essential account of the implementation and changes of some welfare programmes, it has inadequately addressed the slow progress in rural areas' welfare programmes and the different welfare entitlements for rural and urban residents. Further investigation is therefore required to resolve these anomalies. Using the minimum standard of living scheme (MSLS) as a case example, this article illustrates how the Chinese government's legitimacy needs during different stages of its economic reforms have been the principal motivation for the implementation of such schemes. The introduction of an urban MSLS in 1997 aimed to reduce laid-off workers' dissatisfaction following the government's reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The implementation of a rural MSLS in 2007 principally intended to minimise conflicts between land-losing farmers and local officials after widespread rural riots. These MSLSs are also minimal and stigmatising public-assistance schemes that fulfil the dual objective of securing a stable political 2 environment for economic reform and maintaining poor people's work ethic for China's mixed economy.

evaluation arrangements and workload-oriented criteria were unable to effectively assess the 10 impact of social work practices. The study concluded that appropriate legislation is required to 11 safeguard the rights of NGOs.

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Each welfare system has its own welfare relations for shaping and maintaining certain types of welfare practices and welfare ideologies. Welfare relations concern the distribution of welfare responsibilities among various social institutions, the public's welfare expectations and entitlements, and the status of welfare recipients. Welfare policies, which are a legal basis of the dominant class's philosophy as well as a mechanism for policing welfare recipients' use of benefits, play an important role in shaping and constructing the welfare relations of a country. This paper discusses how welfare policies construct the required welfare relations with regard to Hong Kong's social security system. It is argued that the persistence of Hong Kong's residual welfare model is partly based on the residual welfare relations which facilitate family-centred and market-oriented welfare practices.

China's practice of contracting out social services raises two related questions. The first one seeks to determine “the contractual relationship” between the Chinese government and its third sector in a mixed welfare regime. The second one inquires whether China's commissioning welfare strategy has increased the power of its civil society. This study attempts to address these two issues based on the experiences of non‐governmental organisations (NGOs) in a Chinese city. It was found that the contracted NGOs were unable to obtain an equal status but were treated as assistants of local governments. The NGOs were also asked to do extra work that was not listed in the service contracts. Moreover, the service performance assessment criteria were unable to accurately evaluate the work of NGOs. Thus, the welfare participation of Chinese NGOs has not brought with them more political power. It is proposed that China's welfare reform needs to be backed up by its legal reform to put in place a mechanism that tackles the unequal power distribution between welfare purchasers and welfare providers. The study further illustrates that the Chinese government has adopted a pragmatic instrumentalism strategy by placing NGOs in a supplementary and subordinate role. This paper offers a conceptual discourse on analysing the state‐NGOs relationship against China's market reform and its search for a better welfare management strategy.