Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are ad-hoc networks composed primarily of a large number of sensor nodes with limited power, computation, storage and communication capabilities. The issue of securing and authenticating communications in such a network is problematic, and thus an adversary has an opportunity to capture a sensor node directly from the target field and extract all the information from its memory. In 2013, Yoon and Kim proposed an advanced biometric-based user authentication scheme for WSNs. Choi et al. analyzed Yoon and Kim's scheme and performed a security cryptanalysis in 2016. They demonstrated that Yoon and Kim's scheme had several security problems, and proposed instead an improved biometric-based user authentication scheme using fuzzy extraction. However, we cryptanalyze Choi et al.'s scheme and demonstrate that their scheme is vulnerable to insider attack and has a problem with smart card revocation/reissue. To overcome these drawbacks, we propose a secure biometric-based authentication scheme in WSNs that is secure against inside adversaries and provides secure and efficient smart card revocation/reissue.

In this paper, we first investigate the side channel analysis attack resistance of various FPGA hardware implementations of the ARIA block cipher. The analysis is performed on an FPGA test board dedicated to side channel attacks. Our results show that an unprotected implementation of ARIA allows one to recover the secret key with a low number of power or electromagnetic measurements. We also present a masking countermeasure and analyze its second‐order side channel resistance by using various suitable preprocessing functions. Our experimental results clearly confirm that second‐order differential side channel analysis attacks also remain a practical threat for masked hardware implementations of ARIA.

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