Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of top management’s environmental responsibility audit (ERA) implementation on firms’ investment for environmental protection in China. Design/methodology/approach The sample comprises firms publicly traded on A-Share in China from 2011 to 2017. The authors used the ordinary least squares regression model to test the relation between ERA implementation and corporate environmental investment. Findings Firms’ environmental investment increases significantly after the ERA implementation. Compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) are more likely to increase their environmental investment after ERA implementation. Moreover, such change is more likely for non-heavily polluting enterprises (non-HPEs) compared to heavily polluting enterprises (HPEs). Practical implications This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the positive influence of environmental enforcement on corporate behavior, which could serve as reference for regulators on the latest environmental accounting practice in China and other emerging economies. Social implications This paper shows that clear assignment of environmental responsibility and subsequent assessment of environmental performance are contributing factors to effective and efficient implementation of an environmental management system. Originality/value Contributing to accounting and environmental management literature, this paper explains how mandated environmental audit incentivizes firms to deal with environmental issues. Because there is no prior research concerning the mandatory implementation of environmental audit in China, this paper is of high-innovatory value by providing a better understanding of environmental auditing and providing an economic explanation for government intervention as an effective means of mitigating environmental degradation in emerging economies.

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Using a sample of Chinese family firms from 2008-2015, we investigate the impact of trust on the choice of whether to hire a family member or a professional manager as CEO. We find that the presence of a professional CEO is negatively associated with a higher level of trust in family members. In contrast, it is positively associated with a higher level of trust in non-family members. Our findings suggest that the trust mode in Chinese family firms is like the 'differential mode of association', which describes Fei's (1992) social structure of Chinese society. Moreover, a higher level of trust in family members is associated with native entrepreneurial activities, which strengthens the negative relationship between trust in family and the presence of a professional CEO. Furthermore, the role of trust in family firms' appointment decisions is more pronounced in regions with relatively weak legal protection and firms with relatively poor governance. Our results hold when we control for endogeneity and after a series of robustness checks. This research links the governance of family firms to the informal institution of trust, enriching the literature on trust and family firm behaviours.

This study investigates the relationship between Confucianism and auditor judgment. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2006 to 2019, we find that the Confucian atmosphere in auditors’ hometowns is positively associated with their audit adjustments. The mechanism analyses show that Confucianism in auditors’ hometowns can influence auditor morality and further affect their judgment. We also find that the positive relationship between Confucianism in auditors’ hometowns and audit adjustments is reinforced by auditor exposure to strong Confucian atmospheres in their places of education and workplaces but weakened by Western culture diffusion. Moreover, auditors who are more influenced by Confucianism are associated with more improvements in client financial reporting quality, more upward and downward adjustments, more small and large adjustments and more audit effort but not higher audit fees. Overall, this study provides evidence that supports the imprinting effect of traditional Confucianism on auditors.