The mechanism-realist paradigm in the philosophy of science, championed by Mario Bunge and Roy Bhaskar, sets certain expectations for the substantive social-scientific application of the paradigm. To evaluate the application of the paradigm in accomplished substantive research, as well as the potential for future research, I examine the work of Charles Tilly, the exemplary substantive work in the mechanism-realist tradition. Based on this examination, I argue for the usefulness of explanatory mechanisms, provided that they are couched in terms of a heuristic. Such a position is the most reasonable one to adopt given the expectations set by the paradigm in relation to complexity stemming from mechanism interaction and to a notion of causality that is deeper than that acknowledged by empiricism and positivism.

We propose an explanatory framework for the comparative study of radicalization that focuses on its "how" and "when" questions. We build on the relational tradition in the study of social movements and contentious politics by expanding on a mechanism-process research strategy. Attentive to similarities as well as to dissimilarities, our comparative framework traces processes of radicalization by delineating four key arenas of interaction—between movement and political environment, among movement actors, between movement activists and state security forces, and between the movement and a countermovement. Then, we analyze how four similar corresponding general mechanisms—opportunity/threat spirals, competition for power, outbidding, and object shift—combine differently to drive the process. Last, we identify a set of submechanisms for each general mechanism. The explanatory utility of our framework is demonstrated through the analysis of three ethnonational episodes of radicalization: the enosis-EOKA movement in Cyprus (1950-1959), the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland (1969-1972), and the Fatah-Tanzim in Palestine (1995-2001).

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Guerrilla warfare often becomes popular despite the fact that many aspects of it are morally objectionable. Guerrilla groups too, instead of being considered terrorists, often become legitimate political actors. How does this happen? How does the process of legitimation of political violence work? I argue that this process is social and cognitive at the same time, and that a framework for its explanation must be able to account for this dualism. I build such an analytical framework on McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's approach to social movement studies and on the general sociology of Pierre Boudieu. I use it to analyze the legitimation process of the guerilla anti-colonial campaign in Cyprus. In the legitimation process of Cyprus, two social mechanisms proposed by McAdam et al. played a critical role at an early stage-the mechanisms of certification and of boundary-drawing. Later, a social mechanism that I term "valorization" was central as well. To appreciate the effectiveness of these mechanisms, however, I argue that the dispositional facet of the legitimation process must be accounted for as well. I do this through field analysis, focusing in particular on positions of social and symbolic power. The analysis of the legitimation process in Cyprus offers lessons for the study of other similar processes. By showing how the three mechanisms worked effectively, and also showing the limits of their effectiveness, this analysis offers readily comparable causal analogies

To add this web app to the home screen open the browser option menu and tap on Add to homescreen. The dynamics of radicalization: a relational and comparative. Drawing on a comparative historical analysis of al-Qaeda, the Red Brigades, the Cypriot EOKA, the authors develop a relational, mechanism-based theory that advances our understanding of political violence in several important ways by identifying turning points in the radicalization process, similar mechanisms at work .