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Since its introduction in 1977, the institutional/occupational (I/O) thesis has generated a growing body of international research. The basic proposition is that the military is moving from an institutional to an occupational format. The thesis is brought up to date by greater specification of I/O variables in military organization. Variables include legitimacy, role commitments, compensation systems, spouse, reference groups, legal system, and postservice status. The current formulation favors an approach that examines shifting constellations of I/O features within armed forces.

A sociological assessment of the attitudes and behavior of American combat soldiers over the course of the war in Vietnam suggests that primary-group interpretations of combat behavior must be modified, that combat groups were characterized by instrumental relationships and affected by latent ideological factors, and that the 12-month rotation cycle was the dominating feature of the Vietnam combat experience. Troop demoralization was accentuated by diverse sources of conflict, e.g., rank, generation, drug use, and race strife. T h e analysis concludes with a discussion of troop reprisals ("fraggings") against superiors and the paradoxes of the antiwar movement within the military.

Operation Restore Hope was a confusing mission for American soldiers. Trained aswarriors, they were thrust into a humanitarian mission. Expecting to distribute food tograteful Somalis, they were attacked instead by the locals and were limited to security and guard duty. Soldiers' attitudes evolved through three stages: high expectations, disillusionment, and reconsideration. In the last stage, soldiers adopted one of two frameworks to cope with the ambiguity of the mission: warrior versus humanitarian. The former was more strongly associated with whites, men, and combat soldiers, who constructed negative stereotypes of Somalis and favored returning violence with violence. Blacks, women, and support soldiers tended to reject victim-blaming arguments seemingly imported from the United States. They maintained a humanitarian position, seeking explanations for Somali actions and distinguishing between clan warriors and needy refugees. Our data come from field observations, interviews, and surveys of Army troops who served in Somalia.

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