The paper subjects seven structural DSGE models, all used heavily by policymaking institutions, to discretionary fiscal stimulus shocks using seven different fiscal instruments, and compares the results to those of two prominent academic DSGE models. There is considerable agreement across models on both the absolute and relative sizes of different types of fiscal multipliers. The size of many multipliers is large, particularly for spending and targeted transfers. Fiscal policy is most effective if it has moderate persistence and if monetary policy is accommodative. Permanently higher spending or deficits imply significantly lower initial multipliers. (JEL E12, E13, E52, E62)

This paper examines the ways in which central banks influence the very short-term interest rate in regimes with and without reserve requirements. It then examines the implications for monetary policy implementation of the spread of electronic money and the potential for other mechanisms to compete with settlement arrangements at central banks. It concludes that it is extremely unlikely that electronic money will displace bank notes or the settlement services that are offered by central banks in the foreseeable future. Moreover, even in the extremely unlikely case that the spread of stored-value cards leads to the elimination of bank notes and that the development of network money permits alternative settlement services to be offered that effectively competes with central bank services, central banks would very likely be able to continue to influence the very short-term

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. This is the second chapter of a forthcoming monograph entitled "On Implementing Full-Fledged Inflation-Targeting Regimes: Saying What You Do and Doing What You Say." We begin by discussing the costs of inflation, including their role in generating boom-bust cycles. Following a general discussion of the need for a nominal anchor, we describe a specific type of monetary anchor, the inflation-targeting regime, and its two key intellectual roots-the absence of long-run trade-offs and the time-inconsistency problem. We conclude by providing a brief introduction to the way in which inflation targeting works.

This is the sixth of a series of papers that are being written as part of a project to estimate a small quarterly Global Projection Model (GPM). The GPM project is designed to improve the toolkit to which economists have access for studying both own-country and crosscountry linkages. In this paper, we add three more regions and make a number of other changes to a previously estimated small quarterly projection model of the US, euro area, and Japanese economies. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques, which provide a very efficient way of imposing restrictions to produce both plausible dynamics and sensible forecasting properties.

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