People who hold strong opinions on complex social issues are likely to examine relevant empirical evidence in a biased manner. They are apt to accept "confirming" evidence at face value while subjecting "discontinuing" evidence to critical evaluation, and as a result to draw undue support for their initial positions from mixed or random empirical findings. Thus, the result of exposing contending factions in a social dispute to an identical body of relevant empirical evidence may be not a narrowing of disagreement but rather an increase in polarization. To test these assumptions and predictions, subjects supporting and opposing capital punishment were exposed to two purported studies, one seemingly confirming and one seemingly disconfirming their existing beliefs about the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty. As predicted, both proponents and opponents of capital punishment rated those results and procedures that confirmed their own beliefs to be the more convincing and probative ones, and they reported corresponding shifts in their beliefs as the various results and procedures were presented. The net effect of such evaluations and opinion shifts was the postulated increase in attitude polarization.The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by this great and pernicious predetermination the authority of its former conclusion may remain inviolate. (Bacon, 1620(Bacon, /1960 Often, more often than we care to admit, our attitudes on important social issues reflect only our preconceptions, vague impressions, and untested assumptions. We respond to social policies concerning compensatory education, water fluoridation, or energy conser-

It is proposed that several biases in social judgment result from a failure-first noted by Francis Bacon-to consider possibilities at odds with beliefs and perceptions of the moment. Individuals who are induced to consider the opposite. therefore, should display less bias in social judgment. In two separate but conceptually parallel experiments, this reasoning was applied to two domainsbiased assimilation of new evidence on social issues and biased hypothesis testing of personality impressions. Subjects were induced to consider the opposite in two ways: through explicit instructions to do so and through stimulus materials that made opposite possibilities more salient. In both experiments the induction of a consider-the-opposite strategy had greater corrective effect than more demandladen alternative instructions to be as fair and unbiased as possible. The results are viewed as consistent with previous research on perseverance, hindsight, and logical problem solving, and are thought to suggest an effective method of retraining social judgment.

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The contact hypothesis predicts that cooperative interaction with members of a disliked group results in increased liking for those members and generalizes to more positive attitudes toward the group. The authors sought to provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that contact affects attitude in part by eliciting a more positive portrait of the typical group member. Undergraduates participated in a 1-hr dyadic learning session (scripted cooperative learning, jigsaw cooperative learning, or individual study) with a confederate portrayed as a former mental patient. Students initially expected the confederate to display traits similar to those of a typical former mental patient. After the sessions, initially prejudiced students in the 2 cooperative conditions described the typical mental patient more positively and adopted more positive attitudes and wider latitudes of acceptance toward the group. Connections between intergroup attitudes and impression formation are discussed.

Pairs of subjects participated in two unstructured conversations spaced one week apart. In the second session, one subject of the pair was asked to participate either as an ingratiator or as a self-promoter. Naive target subjects clearly distinguished between presenters attempting to appear likable or competent. As verified by observer subjects, ingratiators used reactive verbal and nonverbal behaviors, whereas promoters used proactive behaviors. Preparation time did not produce differential behavioral tactics. The results are discussed in terms of the use of conversational resources to produce the attributions of likability and competence.