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Many of the shortcomings of `positive psychology' seem to stem from its unreflectively perpetuating key assumptions of the very mainstream social science it censures for being too `negative.' Philosophical hermeneutics and related social theory perspectives allow us to identify and critically examine such assumptions, including a one-sided individualism and narrow instrumentalism. Hermeneutics allows us to make sense of the `disguised ideology' that imbues positive psychology and much modern social science, suggests that social inquiry is best seen as a kind of dialogic understanding, and may allow us to take the measure of deep human limitations without falling into cynicism or despair.

The contribution hermeneutic philosophy can make to reflection on issues in psychology is shown through a critique of the "positive psychology" movements inaugurated in the special issue of the American Psychologist edited by M. Seligman and M. Csikszentmihalyi in 2000. Drawing on the broad historical sense advocated by hermeneutics, it is shown that the conceptions of the good life defended by the contributors to the special issue might turn out to be limited to the rather narrow range of questionable and shallow ideals of contemporary Western consumerist economy. In particular, the attempt made by Shelley E. Taylor, et al. (2000) to show that "positive illusions" are conducive to a good life is shown to rest on dubious conceptions about what is genuinely worthwhile in life. As an alternative to the somewhat arid conception of human existence presupposed by the authors contributing to the special issue, Heidegger's (1962) conception of authentic existence is put forward as a hermeneutically inspired basis for rethinking what constitutes the richest and most fulfilling life for humans.