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Many important variables in behavioral development are presumed to be unrelated because of repeated failures to obtain substantial correlations. In this article, we explore the possibility that such null findings have often been due to failures to aggregate. The principle of aggregation states that the sum of a set of multiple measurements is a more stable and representative estimator than any single measurement. This greater representation occurs because there is inevitably some error associated with measurement. By combining numerous exemplars, such errors of measurement are averaged out, leaving a clearer view of underlying relationships. We illustrate the usefulness of this principle in 12 major areas of developmental research in which the issue of negligible correlations figures prominently: (a) the validity of judges' ratings, (b) the cross-situational consistency of moral character and personality, (c) the longitudinal stability of personality, (d) the coherence of stages of cognitive development, (e) metacognition, (f) the attitude-behavior relationship, (g) the personality-behavior relationship, (h) the role-taking/altruism relationship, (i) the moral-judgment/altruism relationship, (j) the legitimacy of the construct of attachment, (k) the existence of sex differences, and (1) the assessment of emotionality in animals. In a final section, we also discuss the implications of the principle of aggregation for conducting experimental research. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Merrill-Palmer Society, Detroit, May 1982. We would like to thank Jack Block, John Borkowski, Douglas Jackson, and Linda Siegel for discussions of the issues involved in this paper. Requests for reprints should be sent to J.

A key problem confronting theories of false memory is that false-memory phenomena are so diverse: Some are characteristic of controlled laboratory tasks, others of everyday life; some occur for traumatic events with legal consequences, others for innocuous events; some are characteristic of one developmental level, others of another developmental level. Fuzzy-trace theory explains false memories via a small set of principles that implement a single representational distinction. Those principles generate new predictions, some of which are counterintuitive.

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Can susceptibility to false memory and suggestion increase dramatically with age? The authors review the theoretical and empirical literatures on this counterintuitive possibility. Until recently, the well-documented pattern was that susceptibility to memory distortion had been found to decline between early childhood and young adulthood. That pattern is the centerpiece of much expert testimony in legal cases involving child witnesses and victims. During the past 5 years, however, several experiments have been published that test fuzzy-trace theory's prediction that some of the most powerful forms of false memory in adults will be greatly attenuated in children. Those experiments show that in some common domains of experience, in which false memories are rooted in meaning connections among events, age increases in false memory are the rule and are sometimes accompanied by net declines in the accuracy of memory. As these experiments are strongly theory-driven, they have established that developmental improvements in the formation of meaning connections are necessary and sufficient to produce age increases in false memory.