Additionality, Clean development mechanism (CDM), CDM projects, Sustainable development, Trade-off,

No abstract

Not only is the climate changing, but so is global climate governance. Climate policy initiatives have proliferated within and beyond the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) regime in a polycentric pattern. Nevertheless, promised action under the Paris Agreement (PA) is far from being sufficient to achieve its targets of keeping global warming below 2 °C. A special research focus has emerged on international ‘climate clubs’, referring to a smaller group’s greater ability to make progress in international climate policy compared to large global forums. Against this background, our paper reflects on the club functions of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC), a transnational partnership that aims at slowing the rate of near-term global warming through the reduction of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs). How does the CCAC contribute to global climate governance and how does this relate to existing structures, such as the UNFCCC process and the PA? Researchers have generally found that climate clubs can raise ambition, produce emissions reductions, and/or enhance cooperation, while generating additional benefits for its members. However, their specific governance contribution remains rather opaque, for example, how emissions reductions are achieved. There is a lack of analytical application, knowledge of the political practice and of in-depth case studies of the clubs concept. This paper contributes to filling this gap by applying central aspects of clubs research, namely membership and size, public goods, and the provision of additional benefits as an analytical framework in one in-depth case study of a governance initiative that has not yet been the subject of academic scrutiny: the CCAC. The results are based on expert interviews and the analysis of strategic and academic documents. Overall, this research finds that the CCAC’s largest contribution to global climate governance lies in preparing SLCP emissions reductions through raising awareness, orchestrating different actors and actions related to SLCPs, and establishing a large technical cooperation network. To some degree it also directly implements SLCP reduction projects. Ultimately, it complements the UNFCCC and especially the Paris Agreement. Members are part of the CCAC because its benefits go beyond climate change mitigation. Its large transnational membership constellation both supports and challenges its governance contribution.

International climate policy is increasingly shaped by alternative forms of governance. Coalitions of national, subnational, and/or non-state actors have the potential to address the global challenge of climate change beyond the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. While initially such “clubs” spurred hope that they could be an option to achieve climate action more effectively than the UNFCCC, more recently, their role has been seen as preparing and orchestrating climate policy. In spite of its conceptual proliferation, literature on climate clubs stops short in examining practical evidence and conducting analyses beyond categorization and labelling of climate clubs. This article aims at contributing to filling this gap with a comparative perspective on three specific governance initiatives that act on different governance levels: the G20, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC), and the Under2 Coalition. What contribution do these club-like initiatives make to global climate governance and how does it relate to existing structures such as the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC process? Our paper applies central aspects of clubs research, namely, membership, public goods, and the provision of additional benefits as an analytical framework to examine the three cases. We find that these club initiatives, though highly diverse in their origin and membership, make a similar contribution to international climate governance. Their largest contribution lies in preparing emissions reductions through raising awareness, orchestrating different actors and actions, and establishing a large cooperation network. They complement the UNFCCC and especially the Paris Agreement.

Recently many regions worldwide have implemented emissions trading systems (ETSs) to cap greenhouse gas emissions. These initiatives may hold the potential of providing a new bottom-up architecture for international climate policy. Cooperation or ‘linkage’ between regional emissions trading systems would improve their efficiency. Yet, linking has been realized only on very few occasions.This article deals with the question why linking of ETSs, especially between the EU and California, is still lagging behind. It seeks to go beyond common approaches and focuses on political difficulties that arise for regions that do not have the status and the mandate of a nation state.