Objective Eating disordered (ED) behaviors (i.e., binge eating, compensatory behaviors, restrictive eating) and nonsuicidal self‐injury (NSSI; intentional and nonsuicidal self‐harm) are highly comorbid and share several similarities, including consequent pain and physical damage. However, whereas NSSI is considered direct self‐harm, ED behaviors are considered indirect self‐harm. These distinctions stem from theoretical understanding that NSSI is enacted to cause physical harm in the moment, whereas ED behaviors are enacted for other reasons, with consequent physical harm occurring downstream of the behaviors. We sought to build on these theoretically informed classifications by assessing a range of self‐harming intentions across NSSI and ED behaviors. Method Study recruitment was conducted via online forums. After screening for inclusion criteria, 151 adults reported on their intent to and knowledge of causing physical harm in the short‐ and long‐term and suicide and death related cognitions and intentions when engaging in NSSI and specific ED behaviors. Results Participants reported engaging in ED and NSSI behaviors with intent to hurt themselves physically in the moment and long‐term, alongside thoughts of suicide, and with some hope and knowledge of dying sooner due to these behaviors. Distinctions across behaviors also emerged. Participants reported greater intent to cause physical harm in the moment via NSSI and in the long‐run via restrictive eating. NSSI and restrictive eating were associated with stronger endorsement of most suicide and death‐related intentions than binge eating or compensatory behaviors. Conclusions Findings shed light on classification of self‐harming behaviors, casting doubt that firm boundaries differentiate direct and indirectly self‐harming behaviors.

Neuroimaging research has identified systems that facilitate minimizing negative emotion, but how the brain is able to transform the valence of an emotional response from negative to positive is unclear. Behavioral and psychophysiological studies suggest a distinction between minimizing reappraisal, which entails diminishing the arousal elicited by negative stimuli, and positive reappraisal, which instead changes the emotional valence of arousal from negative to positive. Here we show that successful minimizing reappraisal tracked with decreased activity in the amygdala, but successful positive reappraisal tracked with increased activity in regions involved in computing reward value, including the ventral striatum and ventromedial pFC (vmPFC). Moreover, positive reappraisal enhanced positive connectivity between vmPFC and amygdala, and individual differences in positive connectivity between vmPFC and amygdala, ventral striatum, dorsomedial pFC, and dorsolateral pFC predicted greater positive reappraisal success. These data broaden models of emotion regulation as quantitative dampening of negative emotion and identify activity in a network of brain valuation, arousal, and control regions as a neural basis for the ability to create positive meaning from negative experiences.

Nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) involves deliberate and intentional injury to body tissue that occurs in the absence of suicidal intent. Typical examples here might include selfcutting, burning, or self-hitting. Behavior of this kind is fundamentally unsettling as well as perplexing. It is also the case that self-harming behavior of any kind runs counter to a fundamental survival instinct. In the past, behaviors such as these were viewed as selfmutilation and considered to be a form of attenuated suicide. Much has changed over time, culminating in the entry of NSSI Disorder into DSM-5 as a condition in need of further study. In this review we describe the evolution of the NSSI construct and consider current issues in its diagnosis and assessment.

Can taking the perspective of other people modify our own affective responses to stimuli? To address this question, we examined the neurobiological mechanisms supporting the ability to take another person's perspective and thereby emotionally experience the world as they would. We measured participants' neural activity as they attempted to predict the emotional responses of two individuals that differed in terms of their proneness to experience negative affect. Results showed that behavioral and neural signatures of negative affect (amygdala activity and a distributed multivoxel pattern reflecting affective negativity) simulated the presumed affective state of the target person. Furthermore, the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)-a region implicated in mental state inference-exhibited a perspective-dependent pattern of connectivity with the amygdala, and the multivoxel pattern of activity within the mPFC differentiated between the two targets. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on perspective-taking and self-regulation.T he ability to respond adaptively in the face of emotionally challenging situations is essential to mental and physical health. So much so, in fact, that emotion dysregulation is a core feature of virtually every form of psychopathology. Given this, it isn't surprising that the last decade has seen enormous growth in behavioral and brain research asking how we can effectively regulate our emotions. Although this work has made many important advances (1, 2), it has focused almost entirely on cognitive regulatory strategies that involve controlling attention to and/or rethinking the meaning of stimuli and events. As such, this work has completely overlooked the way in which social cognitive processes can be used to regulate our emotions.The use of social cognition to regulate emotion was suggested by classic works in social psychology (3), which noted that by simulating others' perspective on the world we could shape our own experience and behavior. It is exemplified by "(Stanislavski) method actors" who understand a role by attempting to generate within themselves the presumed thoughts and feelings of a character, thereby allowing themselves to go beyond the written words in the script and respond as their character would (4). It is also present in everyday life when we seek guidance with respect to emotional dilemmas by asking ourselves how a friend, family member, mentor or religious figure (e.g., "What would Jesus do?") would respond in that situation.In the current research we asked whether and how taking the perspective of other people can modify our own affective responses to stimuli. For example, by thinking of how someone more brave than ourselves would respond to a situation, we might downregulate negative emotions, decrease aggression, and calm frazzled nerves. Alternatively, by thinking of how someone more sensitive and anxious would respond to the situation, we might enhance vigilance and increase reactivity to threatening situations.To address these possi...

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