This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure.

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"This paper examines the association between differences in ownership structure and income smoothing behavior in firms. The underlying constructs affecting this association include agency relationships, managerial incentives, information asymmetry, and firm profitability. A logistic regression model is used to test the association between income smoothing and variables related to inside ownership, institutional holdings, leverage, managerial compensation, profitability, and firm size. The evidence suggests that ownership differences, managers' incentive structures, and firm profitability are important in explaining income smoothing behavior in firms. By separating inside ownership and levels of debt into different levels, we are able to show the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between ownership differences and firms' income smoothing behavior." Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997.

We test the hypothesis that the information content of dividend‐change announcements, as reflected in stock prices, is directly related to the degree of pre‐announcement information asymmetry in the stock. The dividend‐change announcements include initiations, large increases, large decreases, and omissions. Information asymmetry is proxied by the proportion of stock held by institutions. Consistent with the hypothesis, we document a significantly positive relation between the absolute values of the announcement‐period excess returns and the degree of pre‐announcement information asymmetry in the stock. This finding appears to hold for all types of dividend changes except dividend omissions.