The majority of reverse auctions for procurement use a single-attribute (price) format while providing constraints on nonprice attributes such as quality and lead time. Alternatively, a buyer could choose to conduct a multiattribute auction where bidders can specify both a price and levels of nonprice attributes. While such an auction may provide higher theoretical utility to the buyer, it is not clear that this theoretical improvement will be realized given the increased complexity of the auction. In this research, we present an ascending auction mechanism for a buyer whose utility function is known and dependent on three attributes. Motivated by a supply chain procurement problem setting, we consider quality and lead time for the two attributes in addition to price. The auction mechanism provides the bidders with restricted feedback regarding the buyer's utility function. We explore, experimentally, the performance of this multiattribute auction mechanism as compared to a price-only auction mechanism. Compared with the price-only auction, we find that our mechanism design is effective in increasing both buyer utility and bidder (supplier) profits.auctions, experimental economics, supply chain management

At WinterSim 2011, we originally proposed an agent-based framework for healthcare simulations, enabling flexible integration of multiple simulation models, including models of disease progression, effects of provider interventions, and provider behavior models that are responsive to contractual incentives. In this paper, we report results using our proposed framework to integrate two examples of provider behavior models, two examples of disease models, and four examples of payment models. We explore multiple combinations of these models and simulate the impact that alternative payment models may have on health and financial outcomes. These examples test the robustness of the simulation framework, and illustrate the value of such simulations to the policy makers who design incentives to improve cost and health outcomes, and to providers who wish to evaluate the financial impact of proposed incentives on their practice.

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