Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine whether companies engage in earnings management during the specific years when convertible bonds are issued and redeemed; also to determine if any differences exist in earnings management when convertible bonds are issued domestically or abroad. Design/methodology/approach -Discretionary current accruals are adopted as proxies for earnings management and the regression models are used to control the related variables. Findings -The empirical results indicate that companies conduct earnings management in the years when convertible bonds are issued, and that there is no significant difference between earnings management when convertible bonds are issued in Taiwan or abroad. However, data after 2001 indicate that companies issuing convertible bonds abroad perform less earnings management compared to those issuing convertible bonds domestically. The results show no significant difference in earnings management in the years when convertible bonds are redeemed; the reasons may be due to the relatively small sample size and that the majority of convertible bonds are still outstanding. Originality/value -This paper advances findings from previous studies, that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings manage earnings upward to increase the offering proceeds. This paper highlights the linkage between convertible bonds and earnings management. Conducting an integrated analysis of the relationship between convertible bonds and earnings management, it aims to provide a better understanding of the process.

This study uses investment opportunity set (IOS) as an environmental factor, and investigates its moderating effect on the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms (including internal and external corporate governance mechanisms) and firm performance. The empirical results using regression analysis show: (1) The IOS does not have a moderating effect on audit quality and firm performance. (2) The negative relationship between institutional investor ownership and firm performance is stronger for firms with higher investment opportunities. (3) When CEO is the chairman of the board, high growth firms can lead to better firm performance. (4) The relationship between the IOS and pledged shares ratio of directors and supervisors has positive influence on firm performance

This study collects data from Taiwan publicly traded corporations that have banker directors between 2003 and 2007, together with a matching sample consisting of firms without banker directors. Variables used to construct empirical analyses are from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between the presence of banker directors and the likelihood of dividend payment. This study contributes to lacuna in the existing banking literature by providing evidence on how banks influence listed corporate dividend policy in emerging markets