This paper analyses the sweeping changes in industrial relations in South Korea that have taken place since democratisation in 1987, which gave workers the right to organise themselves, and critically reviews the development of social dialogue since the financial crisis of 1997. A number of international labour specialists have maintained that social dialogue plays an important role in enhancing economic restructuring and the stability of industrial relations in order to compete in a global economy. Contrary to the positive assessment of social dialogue, the paper argues that the Korean Tripartite Commission has not reduced the antagonism between unions and employer organisations due to the influence of embedded, state-led economic development. The financial crisis of 1997 merely provided a catalyst to propel the 'historic compromise' of February 1998, without creating effective institutional arrangements to maintain social dialogue. It is worth noting that the uncertainty of social dialogue results from the inability of the Korean Tripartite Commission to encourage employers and workers to trade off wage restraint for job security in the context of a lack of social welfare protections. The paralysed Korean Tripartite Commission provides fertile ground for reflecting on the complex relationship between social dialogue and institutional arrangements.a pv_1432 288..303

This article analyzes the political dynamics of South Korea’s recent administrative reform. We argue that successive South Korean governments’ New Public Management-inspired reform programs have only achieved partial success. In particular, they have largely failed to attain their ultimate goal – i.e. significant weakening of the traditionally strong elite bureaucracy in policymaking. The bureaucracy in the country has not become weakened as a result of the reform. Rather, the central government ministries have augmented their power and institutional autonomy. Those who were in charge of designing and implementing reform measures were bureaucrats themselves who were supposed to be the ‘target’ of the reform. Such situation, in which the reformers were expected to reform themselves, has resulted in numerous incidences of sabotage, delay, obstruction, and distortion of the reform. This article concludes that it is crucial to consider the local contexts in which reform initiatives are adopted, interpreted, accepted, legitimated, and concretized for implementation. Points for practitioners Administrative reform often brings unintended consequences. New Public Management-inspired reform, with its intention to weaken the strong elite bureaucracy, could ironically result in the augmentation of the bureaucracy. The main reason for this is because it is usually the bureaucrats themselves who design and manage the process of administrative reform. It is also the elite bureaucrats who define, operationalize, and implement specific reform measures. Therefore, it is crucial for the reform supporters to ensure adequate popular oversight mechanisms outside the bureaucracy at various stages of the reform process, such as citizen monitoring or civic participation.

This paper argues that the two recent structural transformations of political democratization and market‐oriented economic restructuring have not considerably reduced the role of the strong state in South Korea. Focusing on three sectors (civic groups, big business associations, and labor unions), this paper demonstrates that the strong state in South Korea, by selecting and aligning with different social groups, has been effectively pursuing self‐set reform goals despite the opposition of labor and capital. While the “old” strong state during the authoritarian era used coercion and repression to induce compliance of labor and capital, the “new” strong state after democratization relies on different methods such as coalitions with social groups to legitimize, publicize, and execute its preferred reform policies. The persistence of a strong state in South Korea provides fertile ground for reflecting on the complex relationship between state strength and the quality of democracy.

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