Celanese had several process safety incidents and near misses in 1996. Although there were several root causes, this article will address only one of them; human error. The system which was developed by Celanese to improve this human element is the conduct of operations system. The conduct of operations system has improved process safety performance of the human element by focusing on three operational areas: training, procedures, and general operations. Conduct of operations is a proactive approach to improve the current practices, improve the support systems and the behavior of the operator. The benefits include the following: Consistent application of training and procedures Reduction in human error, and Less process safety incidents This article will describe the need for and the content of conduct of operations system as implemented by Celanese. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2009

For operations where application of standards, regulations, and/or Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices may not be sufficient to address a particular company's risk, several options exist. For qualitative assessment of process hazards, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) and What‐If reviews are two of the most common petrochemical industry methods used. Up to 80% of a company's process hazard analysis (PHA) may consist of HAZOP and What‐If reviews (Nolan, Application of HAZOP and What‐If Safety Reviews to the Petroleum, Petrochemical and Chemical Industries, William Andrew Publishing/Noyes, 1994, p. 1). After the PHA, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is commonly used throughout industry to evaluate the required safety integrity level for instrumented protection layers in a semiquantitative manner (Dowell, International Conference and Workshop on Risk Analysis in Process Safety, CCPS/AIChE, 1997). HAZOP, What‐If, and LOPA are all straightforward methods and are relatively easy to perform. However, much like a hammer, they are not always the best or most appropriate tool for a given job. At times, more advanced methodologies such as Fault Tree Analysis, Quantitative Risk Assessment, Event Tree, Failure Mode, and Effects Analysis and Human Reliability Analysis are necessary to properly assess risk. However, these more advanced tools come with a price. They are often more expensive, time consuming, and require a higher level of expertise. The decision to use these higher level methodologies is not taken lightly and different companies use different criteria for determining when to take this next step. This article will present approaches by four companies, BASF, Celanese, The Dow Chemical Company, and Eastman Chemical Company. Each company will outline criteria used to determine when to go beyond HAZOP, What‐If, and LOPA and will present examples where more advanced techniques were used. The intent of this article is to provide readers with real world examples that demonstrate the appropriate application of the “right” tool and to illustrate what criteria can be used to make informed decisions regarding selection of a PHA methodology. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 38–53, 2017

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The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) developed the Roadmap for Performance Based Navigation (Roadmap) in 2003 [1]. This document outlined the goals associated with the development of performance based navigation (PBN) policies and procedures. In order to support successful implementation of PBN procedures, additional information regarding aircraft navigation capability levels was required. The FAA first tasked MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD) with developing an inventory of equipage to enhance knowledge of PBN capability levels for operations at US airports.Navigational equipment suffixes, filed as part of an instrument flight plan, are useful in identifying Area Navigation (RNAV) capable aircraft. However, these suffixes lack the specificity to characterize Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and RNP Special Aircraft and Aircrew Authorization Required (SAAAR) categories. To further the understanding of aircraft fleet capability, the Fleet Readiness Analysis Tool (FRAT) was developed. It combines data from the inventory as well as equipment filing suffixes and other data sources to create an operations-centric probabilistic view of current PBN capability levels. FRAT has been used to support site identification and prioritization for PBN procedural implementation.In July 2006, an update to the Roadmap was developed and published. In this update the FAA outlines specific goals and milestones for PBN. It defines three time periods of interest: near term (2006 -2010), mid term (2011 -2015), and far term (2016 -2025). Each of these time periods has associated goals and milestones for PBN policy and procedural development. To support the goals in the Roadmap, a future forecast model was developed as part of FRAT to project PBN capability rates into the future. This paper defines and documents PBN capability categories. It provides the current status of the PBN capabilities at the Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) airports. This paper also documents the future forecast methodology of FRAT and presents the analysis results of the FRAT PBN operational forecast.

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