This paper is about the mind of the embedded individual in heterodox economics. Beginning from Margaret Archer's analysis of modes of reflexivity and following the respective contributions of Geoff Hodgson and John Davis, the paper seeks to integrate into Archer's approach a place for habitual beliefs and an analysis of the 'relative autonomy' of the embedded individual. Archer's identification of modes of reflexivity is endorsed but her avoidance of any dispositional place for habit in the mind is questioned. It is argued that by excluding habits in this way, Archer, unlike Davis, implausibly assumes most individuals have achieved relative autonomy in their group associations. The essay develops an approach to the mind that articulates underlying relationships between habits and internal conversation, potentially enriching Archer's explanation of modes of reflexivity while locating Davis's notion of relative autonomy within that framework. Specific economic implications are then briefly considered. * Email: c.g.fuller@uel.ac.ukThe author wishes to thank the editor-in-chief and two anonymous referees for their constructive comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

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In the Spring 1998 (56(1): 47-57) and Fall 1998 (56(3): 295-306, 307-310) issues of this review, Howard Sherman and Geoffrey Hodgson debated, inter alia , the extent to which Veblen-Ayres institutionalism is compatible with Marx and recent Marxist work. This paper argues that the differences between Hodgson and Sherman"s positions do not rely on assumptions of "illogical" behavior, individualist arguments or structural conceptions of the individual. Instead, the debate turns on the authors' respective conceptions of the formation and role of the human mind in what it is to be a social individual.Marxism, Veblen, Habits, Rationality, Class, Institutions,