In this paper, we address the problem of sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants. In a first step, we develop a formal model, which yields the prediction that favorites exert higher productive effort, while underdogs are more tempted to engage in destructive actions (sabotage). This is because favorites have a higher return on productive effort and both types of effort are substitutes. In a second step, we use data from German professional soccer to test this prediction. In line with the model, we find that favorite teams win more tackles in a fair way, while underdog teams commit more fouls.

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Applying detailed within-tournament information about intermediate scores and contestants' ability in rank-order professional soccer tournaments, this study empirically analyzes the impact of interim results on the sabotage activities of heterogeneous contestants. Intermediate information that suggests that a contest is decided early decreases total sabotage. Splitting contestants into favorites and underdogs reveals that both contestants sabotage the most if intermediate information about the score compensates for or decreases ex ante heterogeneity between the teams. However, engaging in sabotage does not pay off for the contestants.

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The purpose of the current study is to investigate how consistency of professional soccer players’ performance affects salaries in the German Bundesliga. Using game-level data for five consecutive seasons ( n = 34,413 player–match day observations), we find empirical evidence for a salary premium to players showing volatility in performance. Applying ordinary least squares, fixed-effects as well as quantile regression analyses, this effect remains robust.