We present the first large-scale studies of three advanced web tracking mechanisms -canvas fingerprinting, evercookies and use of "cookie syncing" in conjunction with evercookies. Canvas fingerprinting, a recently developed form of browser fingerprinting, has not previously been reported in the wild; our results show that over 5% of the top 100,000 websites employ it. We then present the first automated study of evercookies and respawning and the discovery of a new evercookie vector, IndexedDB. Turning to cookie syncing, we present novel techniques for detection and analysing ID flows and we quantify the amplification of privacy-intrusive tracking practices due to cookie syncing.Our evaluation of the defensive techniques used by privacy-aware users finds that there exist subtle pitfallssuch as failing to clear state on multiple browsers at once -in which a single lapse in judgement can shatter privacy defenses. This suggests that even sophisticated users face great difficulties in evading tracking techniques.

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