We present the introduction of transactional memory into the next generation IBM System z CPU. We first describe the instruction-set architecture features, including requirements for enterprise-class software RAS. We then describe the implementation in the IBM zEnterprise EC12 (zEC12) microprocessor generation, focusing on how transactional memory can be embedded into the existing cache design and multiprocessor shared-memory infrastructure. We explain practical reasons behind our choices. The zEC12 system is available since September 2012.

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The IBM POWER6e microprocessor core includes two accelerators for increasing performance of specific workloads. The vector multimedia extension (VMX) provides a vector acceleration of graphic and scientific workloads. It provides single instructions that work on multiple data elements. The instructions separate a 128-bit vector into different components that are operated on concurrently. The decimal floating-point unit (DFU) provides acceleration of commercial workloads, more specifically, financial transactions. It provides a new number system that performs implicit rounding to decimal radix points, a feature essential to monetary transactions. The IBM POWERe processor instruction set is substantially expanded with the addition of these two accelerators. The VMX architecture contains 176 instructions, while the DFU architecture adds 54 instructions to the base architecture. The IEEE 754R Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic Standard defines decimal floating-point formats, and the POWER6 processor-on which a substantial amount of area has been devoted to increasing performance of both scientific and commercial workloads-is the first commercial hardware implementation of this format.

Abstract. We consider machine-aided verification of suitably constructed abstractions of security protocols, such that the verified properties are valid for the concrete implementation of the protocol with respect to cryptographic definitions. In order to link formal methods and cryptography, we show that integrity properties are preserved under step-wise refinement in asynchronous networks with respect to cryptographic definitions, so formal verifications of our abstractions carry over to the concrete counterparts. As an example, we use the theorem prover PVS to formally verify a system for ordered secure message transmission, which yields the first example ever of a formally verified but nevertheless cryptographically sound proof of a security protocol. We believe that a general methodology for verifying cryptographic protocols cryptographically sound can be derived by following the ideas of this example.

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