No abstract

Background: Seeing how governments formulate decisions on our behalf is a crucial component of their ability to claim democratic legitimacy. This includes being seen to draw on the knowledge and evidence produced by their civil service policy advisers. Yet much of the advice provided to governments is being increasingly withdrawn from public accessibility.Aims and objectives: To counter this diminishing transparency, I propose a framework for observing how evidence is made and used in the political decision-making process. Although my framework is constructed within the Australian context, I hope to encourage its use in other government and policy settings.Methods: Using an example from my own research into the language of rejected policy advice, I construct a framework for locating how policy actors formulate and communicate their evidence. With primary material drawn from Freedom of Information releases, my framework qualitatively examines three impact factors with which to situate policy advice: text, organisational influences and the interplay between the front and back regions of politics and policy. To counter releases’ limitations, they are contextualised with publicly available, contemporaneous statements.Findings: Text displayed excessive detail, inviting multiple interpretations. Organisational influences suggested an insular culture over-reliant on its reputation. Interplay linked to evidence as ostensibly authority-imparting but ultimately adding to the lack of transparency around how political decisions were made.Discussion and conclusions: Even when processes are hidden from public view, they can be found. By connecting an array of impact factors, my framework here illuminated a complex choreography of civil servants communicating with their government about a contentious policy issue and revealed the political affordances they enabled in the process.<br />Key messages<br /><ul><li>It is difficult to observe how policy knowledge is constructed and if or how it informs political decision making.</li><br /><li>Interviews and ethnographic research have been recommended as ways to understand the inner workings of policy organisations – but these are not always possible (or reliable), especially for researchers who want to qualitatively examine politically uncomfortable policy issues.</li><br /><li>To counter diminishing transparency, I propose a framework for getting closer to watching how evidence is made and used, which includes analyses of texts, organisational culture, and the interplay between policy and politics.</li></ul>

No abstract

No abstract

In an environment that values them in word but not necessarily in deed, it should not be difficult for interested publics to understand the advice that goes to governments as the ostensible base (or not) of policy decisions. This book is not a manual for how to make it easier. It is, as Foucault puts it, 'a challenge directed to what is ' (1991: 84). In challenging what is-no matter who is in power-it also seeks to elevate the critical contribution that courageous policy advisers could make towards helping publics determine what is in their interest. If it succeeds in doing so, it will be up to those who agree to take the next steps. 1. INTRODUCTION 9This image, Majone suggests, is misguided because policy analysts or advisers should be producer[s] of policy arguments, more similar to a lawyer-a specialist in legal arguments-than to an engineer or a scientist. His basic skills are not algorithmical but argumentative: the ability to probe assumption critically, to produce and evaluate evidence, to keep many threads in hand, to draw an argument from many disparate sources, to communicate effectively. He recognizes that to say anything of importance in public policy requires value judgements, which must be explained and justified. (Majone 1989: 21-22) However, the reality is that, as 'firm believer[s] in the virtues of the scientific method' (Majone 1989: 36), policy advisers will generally not produce arguments in the manner suggested. This adherence to scientism is a mistake, in Majone's (1989: 37) estimation, because '[i]n policy analysis, as in science and in everyday reasoning, few arguments are purely rational or purely persuasive. A careful blend of reason and persuasion is usually more effective than exclusive reliance on one or the other.' Strategies of Impersonality: Constructing a Framework for the Rebuffed1 See Wikimedia Commons (2015).1 The day after the blackout, Turnbull (2016b) told journalists 'these intermittent renewables do pose real challenges … energy security should always be the key priority'. 2 See pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/foi-log/FOI-2016-178.pdf, from which all cited departmental material is taken. The Australia Institute's request was for 'all correspondence created by the Department (including briefings, reports and advice) sent from the Department to any Minister or Minister's office between 18 September and 18 October 2016 which related to: the blackout event in South Australia on 28 September 2016; state level renewable energy targets; the impact of renewable electricity generation on electricity prices; "energy security", "reliability", "grid stability"; frequency; or the South Australian blackout event 28 September' (see PM&C n.d.).