Intensified globalization, especially the necessity to learn more about how administrative reforms work effectively in different cultural contexts, requires public administration research to embrace comparative perspectives. How well is the field advancing in that direction? This article presents the results of a content analysis of 151 comparative public administration articles from 2000 to 2009. Results indicate that comparative research is building on theory and empirical research, making use of purposive samples, and using a mix of causal, descriptive, and exploratory methodologies. Subject matter varies widely, but most research focuses on European, Asian, and North American countries. Comparative research is primarily qualitative, making extensive use of existing data. The authors recommend enhanced application of mixed methods, increased use of culture as a key concept, and integration of a broad range of social sciences to encourage more students, practitioners, and scholars to think and work comparatively. Three senior comparative scholars respond, sparking a fascinating and insightful dialogue on this seminal topic in public administration.

This study reviews the funding status of state-administered pension plans and their impact on state credit quality. As the fund ratio (actuarial assets/actuarial accrued liability) of state-administered pension plans decreases, states are more likely assigned a lower rating. Moreover, rating outlooks are sensitive to the fund ratio, especially for migration between stable and negative outlooks for states with lower fund ratios. These results are a timely pretest to the 2013/2014 implementation of GASB Statements No. 67 and 68, serving as a benchmark to assess whether new reporting requirements will yield information to alter the market's response to unfunded pension liabilities.

This article investigates the impact of state-level tax and expenditure limits (TELs) on state government revenues and aid to local governments. Using an instrumental variable approach to control for endogeneity, the authors find that the general fund TELs (i.e., revenue and expenditure limits) have led to substantial increases in tax and nontax revenues. States with procedural limits (i.e., those with voter approval and/or legislative supermajority requirements votes) have significantly lower tax revenues. For states with these procedural limits, their ability to impose new or higher taxes is limited by the rules for passing such legislation. This study also finds that states with general fund TELs have higher levels of aid to local governments, while Downloaded from those with procedural TELs have lower levels of aid. Local government property tax limits do not have any impact on taxing authority of states and have only marginal impacts on the state-aid programs.Keywords tax and expenditure limits (TELs), state government revenues, intergovernmental relations, instrumental variablesThe effect of tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) on government spending has been theoretically debated and empirically tested since the early adoption of TELs. This study contributes to this literature by making three contributions. First, whereas prior studies have focused on the TEL's base (revenue limit or expenditure limit), method of approval (voter initiative, referendum, or a legislative vote), institutional codification (constitutional or statutory), or the fiscal growth factor (personal income or population growth plus inflation), or some combination of the above, this study highlights the importance of understanding how these limits are executed. The relevant construct, and the one we advance in this article, distinguishes between limits on the general fund (i.e., revenue or expenditure limits) and procedural limits on taxing authority (i.e., legislative supermajority or voter approval requirements for new or higher taxes; Kioko 2011; Stark 2001). We find tax and nontax revenues are higher in states with general fund limits, while tax revenues are significantly lower in states with procedural limits. This suggests that imposing new or higher taxes is more difficult in states with procedural limits. We also find aggregating general fund and procedural limits into a single measure, or excluding either of these institutions, could lead to omitted variable bias.Second, we find that the question of endogeneity of these institutions has been largely overlooked. In this study, we attempt to improve upon prior estimates through an instrumental variable approach. A crucial instrument and a critical component of the tax revolt movement are the voter initiative provisions. Robustness tests reveal these to be weak and our examination of the literature suggests these instruments would be relevant explanatory variables. In our alternative instrumental variable specification, we consider the structure of the voter initiative provision...

Following a wave of state‐adopted tax and expenditure limitations (TELs), in 1992 the state of Colorado amended its constitution with the strictest TEL to date. Called the Taxpayer Bill of Rights and known as TABOR, the amendment has limited the size and scope of Colorado governments. Praised as a restraint on unbridled government growth in good economic times, TABOR reared its highly restrictive head as the state economy turned downward. The central issue explored is how binding tax and expenditure limitations affect the state’s ability to weather economic recessions and employ sound fiscal management practices. As in most institutional arrangements, the devil is in the details. The analysis presented here reveals that binding limitations create perverse incentives for budgetary actors to earmark, privatize, and shift responsibilities to other jurisdictions, which ultimately combine to reduce the state government’s ability to perform and to maintain sound fiscal management practices.

Although previous work on fiscal federalism and grants has focused on the effects of grants on expenditures, no published research examines the impact of decreasing grants on state financing. This research addresses how decreasing levels of federal grant money to states affect states' long-term debt issuance, and whether the relationship is symmetric for increasing and decreasing grants. The model is tested with time series, cross-sectional data from 1984 to 1999. The results show that grants affect debt issuance, the effect is asymmetric, and direction of the effect differs for different types of debt issuance.