Prior studies suggest that venture capitalists (VCs) play a monitoring role. We predict and find that IPO-year abnormal accruals are lower in the presence of VCs for a sample of 2,630 IPO firms during 1983–2001. Our findings are robust to controls for the endogenous choice of VC financing. We consistently find that the VC effect holds even when controlling for IPO lock-up provisions, VC partial cashing out subsequent to the IPO, and alternative proxies for earnings management. In addition, our findings do not support the claims of critics that VCs inflated earnings during the Internet IPO bubble. Finally, we provide some evidence that the lower earnings management associated with VC monitoring partially explains the superior post-IPO returns of VC-backed firms.

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We explore the market response to announcements of first-time goingconcern (GC) audit opinions and, for a subset of these cases, their subsequent withdrawal, from 1993 to 2005. We find that the market fully responds to GC withdrawal announcements but underreacts to the GC announcements themselves, resulting in a downward drift of −14% over the one-year period subsequent to the GC opinion. This result is robust to alternative explanations documented in prior literature. However, after adjusting for transactions costs, the opportunity to earn profits by trading on this market anomaly is limited. We demonstrate that despite such clear adverse signals about the firm's continuing financial viability, this information is not being fully impounded by the market on a timely basis. Our findings differ from those of others who suggest that there is no pricing anomaly associated with GC opinions in the United States. We show that this is likely due to important issues with their research methods. * Manchester Business School, University of Manchester; †Martin Currie Professor of Finance and Investment, University of Edinburgh; ‡Fordham University. This paper has benefited from the helpful comments made