Using a large sample of multinational corporations (MNCs), we examine the location of earnings management within the firm. We posit and find that MNCs manage their consolidated earnings through an orchestrated reporting strategy across subsidiaries over which they exert significant influence. Specifically, we find that headquarters' influence on subsidiary earnings management increases with the degree of subsidiary integration and the extent of earnings management opportunities. Most importantly, we provide evidence that MNCs exploit regulatory arbitrage opportunities arising from cross-country differences in institutional quality. We document that, in response to exogenous improvements in the quality of their home-country institutions, MNCs rebalance their reporting strategies by clustering earnings management in subsidiaries from countries with more lenient regulations. Taken together, our findings yield important insights on the drivers of earnings management location within the firm and highlight the need for better cross-country coordination in regulatory design. JEL Classifications: F23; G15; G34; G38; M41; M48.

Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Stock Price InformativenessBeuselinck, C.A.C.; Joos, P.P.M.; Khurana, I.K.; van der Meulen, S. Publication date: 2010 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA):Beuselinck, C. A. C., Joos, P. P. M., Khurana, I. K., & van der Meulen, S. (2010). Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Stock Price Informativeness. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2010-82). Tilburg: Accounting. General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Stock Price InformativenessAbstract: In this paper, we examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS influences the flow of firm-specific information and contributes to stock price informativeness as measured by stock return synchronicity. Using a constant sample of 1,904 mandatory IFRS adopters in 14 EU countries for the period 2003-2007, we find a V-shaped pattern in synchronicity around IFRS adoption, which is consistent with IFRS disclosures revealing new firm-specific information in the adoption period (i.e., a reduction of synchronicity) and subsequently lowering the surprise of future disclosures (i.e., an increase in synchronicity). We also find mandatory IFRS adoption increases analysts' ability to incorporate industry-level information into stock price. However, we are unable to detect a reduction in the private information advantage enjoyed by institutional owners post-IFRS adoption. Moreover, we find the synchronicity effects to be more pronounced for firms in countries with larger differences in local GAAP relative to IFRS. Overall, our evidence yields novel insights on the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption by investigating its effect on stock price informativeness and the distinctive roles played by a firm's information environment.

International audienceThis paper examines the impact of tax enforcement and public listing status on income shifting by multinational corporations (MNCs). For a sample of over 8,000 subsidiaries that are majority-owned by 959 European MNCs over the period 1998–2009, we find strong evidence of income shifting from high to low tax countries and that income is shifted more out of high-tax countries when local tax enforcement is weak. In addition, we show that private MNCs exploit weak tax enforcement more to shift income out of the parent country compared to public MNCs. Combined, our results suggest that tax enforcement plays a crucial role in MNC income shifting decisions and that shifting is more aggressive when MNCs are less affected by nontax shifting costs as is the case in private MNCs