Building on Bourdieu's social theory, this article shows how powerful agents are able to challenge deeply engrained assumptions about the value of nuclear weapons. To illustrate the value of a Bourdieu-inspired analysis in the field of nuclear weapons, we apply his thinking tools of field, symbolic capital and doxa to the recent plea for nuclear disarmament by the US elder statesmen Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn. We analyse how the four revitalized the topic of nuclear disarmament, moving it from the fringes of peace research and grass-roots advocacy to the mainstream of academic research and politics. We argue that the historical context, the high symbolic capital of Shultz and his colleagues, and an appealing narrative that draws on commonplace understandings made their plea resonate with security elites.

Preserving the trust of bond markets is crucial for the world's many indebted countries, but it is still unclear when and how national or international actors can contribute to this goal. We present a set of arguments addressing this question and test them on the case of the eurozone debt crisis. Distinguishing between actors' capacity and willingness to avoid defaults, we argue that the crisis was marked by a lack of capacity at the national level, and limited or uncertain willingness at the European level. Accordingly, we find that European‐level efforts to reassure markets had considerably stronger effects than similar efforts at the national level. Furthermore, national efforts appear to have mattered the least in countries with the least capacity. These findings are based on a comprehensive new dataset of political events and relevant news, and they hold across a number of robustness checks and placebo tests.

We examine the impact of signals regarding the Eurozone’s bail-out commitment on government bond spreads in the Eurozone’s periphery, analysing the effect of positive, negative and mixed statements and decisions by the EU, the ECB and Germany. We construct a dataset of relevant events, and estimate their effects using distributed lag models, providing a number of robustness checks. Our main argument is that investors react to statements from credible actors, but largely ignore statements from less-credible actors, awaiting actual decisions. Accordingly, positive statements from the ECB have clear effects, while those from Germany and the EU do not. Furthermore, ECB decisions appear to be anticipated and thus have no short-term effects, while we find clear effects of positive decisions by Germany and the EU.

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