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While Augustine distinguishes free choice from true liberty, his account of human freedom implies further distinctions which Augustine himself does not make explicit. More importantly, Augustine regards these distinct types of freedom as qualitatively different; some are clearly superior to others. Descartes also distinguishes qualitatively different types of freedom, and does so in a way that parallels Augustine's view. I here argue that Augustine divides freedom into four qualitatively distinct grades, and then demonstrate that Descartes' account of freedom is a rationalist adaptation of the theory of free choice found in Augustine.

This article recovers the figure of the ancient satyr as a mythic modality of satire by reimagining Kenneth Burke's own satires as exemplary of satyric rhetoric. First, it dispels the notion that, on one hand, satire and the satyr are unrelated because of uncertain etymologies and, on the other, that satire is an inherently destructive critical enterprise. Myth is deployed as a constructive means of juxtaposing Burke's conceptualization of satyrs with that of Friedrich Nietzsche. The Helhaven satire and “Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven” are then presented as illustrations of the satyric lurking throughout Burke's philosophy. Ultimately, a case is made for the figure of the satyr as a mythic goad by which to revise our understanding of contemporary satire as a comic enterprise. The article also serves as a resource for conceiving satyric correctives as the comic corrective pushed to the end of its line.

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