Summary We use a novel data set within an instrumental variables framework to test whether the presence and language of constitutional environmental rights influence environmental outcomes. The outcome variables include Yale's Environmental Performance Index and its components. We employ two‐stage least squares to account for reverse causality, that is, the possibility that a country which takes steps to protect the environment might also be more likely to constitutionalize environmental rights. Our first stage theory combines constitution norms, opposition costs, and generation effects. Our controls include country income, which means that our study is also related to the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature. We find that constitutions do indeed matter for positive environmental outcomes, which suggests that we should not only pay attention to the incentives confronting polluters and resource users, but also to the incentives and constraints confronting those policymakers who initiate, monitor, and enforce environmental policies.

I thank Amy Jeffords for her love and support, and for helpful editing. I thank Lanse Minkler and Shareen Hertel for helpful comments and suggestions that led to improvements in this paper. I also thank Joshua Berning and participants at the 2011 Economics and Social Rights Group Workshop for thoughtful discussions.

The global trend toward adopting environmental rights within national constitutions has been largely regarded as a positive development for both human rights and the natural environment. The impact of constitutional environmental rights, however, has yet to be systematically assessed using empirical data. In particular, expanding procedural environmental rights—legal provisions relating to access to information, participation, and justice in environmental matters—provides fertile ground for analyzing how environmental rights directly interface with conditions necessary for a functioning democracy. To understand the extent to which these provisions deliver on their lofty aspirations, we conducted a quantitative analysis to assess the relationship between procedural environmental rights and environmental justice, while also controlling for the extent of democracy within a country. The results suggest that states with procedural environmental rights are more likely than nonadopting states to facilitate attaining environmental justice, especially as it relates to access to information.

Politically motivated consumption behaviors (such as boycotts) are a significant source of human rights mobilization, yet the roots of individual consumption decisions are under-explored in the human rights literature. This article uses original national survey data to evaluate key factors that influence individual decisions to stop purchasing products for broader social purposes, highlighting the role that personal interest, access to particular types of information, and a sense of efficacy play in shaping the decision to consume ethically.

We present a neoclassical economic model of the human right to water using a nonrenewable resource model inclusive of a backstop technology. The right is interpreted as a minimum consumption requirement the government is obligated to fulfill in the event that any one household cannot do so independently. Differing by income levels, households maximize utility by purchasing a composite consumption good and water from two distinct, government-owned sources. Facing physical and financial constraints, the government uses fiscal policy to address potential human rights violations. Reducing the analysis to two periods, we develop a novel approach to compare total welfare levels from a joint human rights and neoclassical economics perspective. We define a human rights welfare standard and discuss cases in which traditional social welfare measures would exceed, violate, or meet this standard. We thus offer a unique way to merge economic analysis with human rights research.