Why do some banks fail in financial crises while others survive? This article answers this question by analysing the effect of the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s on 142 banks, of which 33 failed.We find that choices of balance sheet composition and product market strategy made in the lead-up to the crisis had a significant impact on banks' subsequent chances of experiencing distress. We document that high-risk banks -those operating highly-leveraged portfolios and attracting large quantities of deposits -were more likely to fail. Branching and international activities also increased banks' default probabilities. We measure the effects of board interlocks, which have been characterized in the extant literature as contributing to the Dutch crisis. We find that boards mattered: failing banks had smaller boards, shared directors with smaller and very profitable banks and had a lower concentration of interlocking directorates in non-financial firms.

Why did imitations of Raiffeisen's rural cooperative savings and loans associations work well in some European countries, but fail in others? This article considers the example of Raiffeisenism in Ireland and in the Netherlands. Raiffeisen banks arrived in both places at the same time, but had drastically different fates. In Ireland they were almost wiped out by the early 1920s, while in the Netherlands they proved to be a long‐lasting institutional transplant. Raiffeisen banks were successful in the Netherlands because they operated in niche markets with few competitors, while rural financial markets in Ireland were unsegmented and populated by long‐established incumbents, leaving little room for new players, whatever their institutional advantages. Dutch Raiffeisen banks were largely self‐financing, closely integrated into the wider rural economy, and able to take advantage of economic and religious divisions in rural society. Their Irish counterparts were not.

Social capital is increasingly conceptualised in academic and policy literature as a panacea for a range of health and development issues, particularly in the context of HIV. In this paper, we conceptualise social capital as an umbrella concept capturing processes including networks, norms, trust and relationships that open up opportunities for participation and collective action that allow communities to address issues of common concern. We specifically outline social capital as comprising three distinct forms: bonding, bridging and linking social capital. Rather than presenting original data, we draw on three well-documented and previously published case studies of health volunteers in South Africa. We explore how social contexts shape the possibility for the emergence and sustainability of social capital. We identify three cross-cutting contextual factors that are critical barriers to the emergence of social capital: poverty, stigma and the weakness of external organisations' abilities to support small groups. Our three case studies suggest that the assumption that social capital can be generated from the ground upwards is not reasonable. Rather, there needs to be a greater focus on how those charged with supporting small groups-non-governmental organisations, bureaucracies and development agencies-can work to enable social capital to emerge.

Geary and Stark find that Ireland's post‐Famine per capita GDP converged with British levels, and that this convergence was largely due to total factor productivity growth rather than mass emigration. In this article, new long‐run measurements of human capital accumulation in Ireland are devised in order to facilitate a better assessment of sources of this productivity growth, including the relative contribution of men and women. This is done by exploiting the frequency at which age data heap at round ages, widely interpreted as an indicator of a population's basic numeracy skills. Because Földvári, van Leeuwen, and van Leeuwen‐Li find that gender‐specific trends in this measure derived from census returns are biased by who is reporting and recording the age information, any computed numeracy trends are corrected using data from prison and workhouse registers, sources in which women ostensibly self‐reported their age. The findings show that rural Irish women born early in the nineteenth century had substantially lower levels of human capital than uncorrected census data would otherwise suggest. These results are large in magnitude and thus economically significant. The speed at which women converged is consistent with Geary and Stark's interpretation of Irish economic history; Ireland probably graduated to Europe's club of advanced economies thanks in part to rapid advances in female human capital.

This article investigates the impact of the socioreligious segregation of Dutch society on the asset allocation choices of rural bankers and the withdrawal behavior of their depositors during the early 1920s. Results suggest that cooperatively-owned Raiffeisen banks for both Catholic and Protestant minority groups could limit their exposure to a debt-deflation crisis, despite operating more precarious balance sheets than banks for majorities. Business histories demonstrate how strict membership criteria and personal guarantors acted as screening and monitoring devices. Banks serving minorities functioned as club goods, managing their exposure to the crisis by exploiting the confessionalized nature of Dutch society.