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One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.

THE EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT OF CONSIDERED MORAL JUDGMENTS by Christopher Michael CloosThe input objection to reflective equilibrium (RE) claims that the method fails as a method of moral justification. According to the objection, considered moral judgments (CMJs) are not truth-conducive. Because the method uses inputs that are not credible, the method does not generate justified moral beliefs. The objection is solved by reinterpreting RE using contemporary developments in ethical intuitionism. The first half of the thesis sets up the input objection, explores potential responses to the objection, and uncovers the best way to solve the objection. The second half of the thesis solves the input objection by defining key terms, detailing the revised RE procedure, reinserting the notion of a competent moral judge into the method, using intuitionist criteria for identifying genuine moral intuitions, creating three filters capable of sorting good from bad CMJs, and showing how it is possible to assign evidential weight to CMJs so that they can be used as standards against which moral principles can be measured and a justified moral theory realized. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe a debt of gratitude to William H. Shaw for his patient guidance during directed readings on this topic, useful dialogue on issues concerning moral epistemology and extensive feedback on ways to make this thesis more concise and effective. I also owe sincere thanks to Anand J. Vaidya for extensive comments on points of concern. His comments prompted many beneficial refinements. I also thank Richard L. Tieszen for his feedback and objections. In addition, I wish to thank the many philosophy professors I took classes from while in the program and the graduate students with whom I discussed issues related to this thesis. It was the students' desire for excellence in philosophy that prompted me to seek greater rigor in my philosophical abilities. Lastly, any remaining errors in this thesis are squarely the responsibility of the author.