Psychometricians strive to eliminate random error from their psychological inventories. When random error affecting tests is diminished, tests more accurately characterize people on the psychological dimension of interest. We document an unusual property of the scoring algorithm for a measure used to assess a wide range of psychological states. The "D-score" algorithm for coding the Implicit Association Test (IAT) requires the presence of random noise in order to obtain variability. Without consequential degrees of random noise, all individuals receive extreme scores. We present results from an algebraic proof, a computer simulation, and an online survey of implicit racial attitudes to show how trial error can bias IAT assessments. We argue as a result that the D-score algorithm should not be used for formal assessment purposes, and we offer an alternative to this approach based on multiple regression. Our critique focuses primarily on the IAT designed to measure unconscious racial attitudes, but it applies to any IAT developed to provide psychological assessments within clinical, organizational, and developmental branches of psychology-and in any other field where the IAT might be used.

Left-out variable error and measurement correspondence are core principles that need to be considered when modeling the relative contributions of implicit and explicit constructs in the prediction of health behaviors. (PsycINFO Database Record

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With the general public spending increasing amounts of time in virtual gaming worlds, it is relevant to explore social influence dynamics that can occur in virtual reality settings. Three studies tested the hypothesis that transportation into a virtual game heightens susceptibility to influence from in-game health communications. Study 1 participants played a first-person shooter game that had either landscape paintings or graphic anti-DUI (drive under the influence of alcohol) messages embedded in the background of scenes. Results indicated that, to the extent gamers were transported into the virtual experiences in the game, willingness to DUI was reduced by the presence of anti-DUI graphic messages. Study 2 explored potential mechanisms driving this effect and revealed evidence that transportation disrupts counter-arguing among individuals who might otherwise resist real-world influence attempts. Study 3 replicated Studies 1 and 2 findings but also pointed to a potential “boomerang effect” that can occur when transportation is not achieved in a game. Discussion focused on the potential positive and negative consequences of embedding persuasive health communications into the background of virtual gaming worlds.

Evaluating others is a fundamental feature of human social interaction–we like those who help more than those who hinder. In the present research, we examined social evaluation of those who not only intentionally performed good and bad actions but also those to whom good things have happened (the lucky) and those to whom bad things have happened (the unlucky). In Experiment 1a, subjects demonstrated a sympathetic preference for the unlucky. However, under cognitive load (Experiment 1b), no such preference was expressed. Further, in Experiments 2a and 2b, when a time delay between impression formation (learning) and evaluation (memory test) was introduced, results showed that younger (Experiment 2a) and older adults (Experiment 2b) showed a significant preference for the lucky. Together these experiments show that a consciously motivated sympathetic preference for those who are unlucky dissolves when memory is disrupted. The observed dissociation provides evidence for the presence of conscious good intentions (favoring the unlucky) and the cognitive compromising of such intentions when memory fails.