One of the notable features of the most recent presidential administrations has been the increasing prevalence of vacancies in presidentially appointed and Senate‐confirmed positions. This article explains when and how presidents actively take control of those positions once they become vacant. It evaluates its claims with original data on the most important Senate‐confirmed positions during the first year of the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, with a total of nearly 5,000 quarterly observations of 1,009 administration‐position cases. Estimates from Markov multistate models reveal that presidents use non‐default acting officials more frequently in ideologically opposed agencies, agencies connected to their campaign priorities, and the highest tier of leadership positions. Further, presidents pursue confirmation sparingly, often opting instead to use non‐default acting officials for extended periods of time. These results suggest that presidents have significant discretion over the leadership of the executive establishment that is at odds with our separation of powers system of government and the Senate's constitutional role to provide advice and consent on presidential appointees.

The combination of the high workload associated with keeping top executive branch positions filled and political dysfunction has led to longer and more frequent periods of vacancies in the U.S. executive branch. While scholars commonly claim that such vacancies are harmful for performance, this claim has been difficult to evaluate because of theoretical disagreement, conceptual confusion, and measurement challenges. In this paper we evaluate the relationship between vacancies and performance, describing primary mechanisms by which vacancies (as opposed to turnover) influence performance. We conduct a cross-sectional study using new data on appointee vacancies during the Trump Administration and original performance data from a 2020 survey of federal executives. The Survey on the Future of Government Service includes questions designed to measure comparative self-reported agency performance and questions targeting the mechanisms hypothesized to link vacancies and performance. The paper includes efforts to define and validate the measure of performance, assess the directionality of the relationship between vacancies and performance, control for potential confounders that may explain both vacancies and performance, and evaluate the mechanisms by which vacancies negatively affect performance. The results from OLS models suggest that persistent vacancies are correlated with lower performance. In particular, agencies with persistent vacancies (e.g., 3-4 years) have performance ratings of about one standard deviation lower than those agencies with consistent confirmed leadership. The most likely mechanisms leading to these results are the effect of vacancies on leader time horizons, agency morale, and investment by key stakeholders. We conclude with implications for appointment politics and administrative politicization

With dozens of mandates, federal agencies have considerable discretion in how they focus their time and resources. In this article, I explain how presidents influence agency goals, focusing on how appointee teams are essential to prioritizing and resetting agency goals. Using original data on federal agency goals from the Obama administration to the Trump administration, my analysis of strategic and priority goals across 56 agencies reveals that agencies in which the president has a higher percentage of key appointed positions filled experienced higher levels of long-term goal change. This finding highlights the president's immediate need to get their appointee teams in place to alter the course of agency policymaking for their whole first term.When President Trump assumed office, agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had among their most important priorities to "reduce greenhouse gas emissions" and "strengthen environmental protections," even though Trump had said on the campaign trail that he would "get rid of [the EPA] in almost every form" and promised to "end intrusive EPA regulations" (EPA 2016;Trump 2017;Washington Post 2017). Attached to each priority goal was a high-level goal leader, the Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Office of Air and Radiation (OAR) and the Deputy Chief Financial Officer, whose job it was to ensure the achievement of the goal and report to agency leadership and outside stakeholders on the progress toward completion. The EPA mentioned these goals specifically in their FY 2016 and 2017 budget justifications and outlined how funds would be used to reach these goals 140 Presidential Studies Quarterly

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