The breakdown of democracies has long been associated with poor economic performance. This study attempts to determine whether different configurations of democratic institutions can mediate the effects of poor economic performance. Using an original data set that includes all democracies from the period 1919 to 1995, we use continuous-time duration analysis to test hypotheses derived from the literature on democratization. Specifically, we test the interaction of party system and the configuration of legislative and executive power (parliamentarism and presidentialism) with economic performance to explain the likelihood of breakdown. Results suggest that majoritarian variants of democracy are more resistant to economic contraction than pluralist ones. Under conditions of economic growth, pluralist democracies outperform majoritarian ones.We thank the following people for help in compiling the data set:

Using an original dataset that covers the period from 1951 to 1995, we consider the enduring effects of Western overseas colonialism on the democratic survival of postcolonial democracies. We treat colonialism as a holistic phenomenon and differentiate the relative effects of its legacies with regard to the level of economic development, social fragmentation, and the relationship between the state and civil society. We find that Western overseas colonialism, a factor often overlooked in recent large-n studies, continues to have an effect on the survival of democratic regimes. We further find that the legacy of specific colonial powers has an important effect on survival as well. Unlike previous studies, we find that former Spanish colonies outperform British colonies when colonialism is conceptualized holistically. However, when we break colonial legacy into separate components (development, social fragmentation, and the relationship between the state and civil society), we find that the advantages former British colonies enjoy are attributable to the legacy of the state/civil society relationship. Moreover, we show that at least in the case of former British colonies, time spent under colonial rule is positively associated with democratic survival.

Many scholars have argued that unequal socioeconomic distribution constitutes a threat to democratic survival. However, the evidence in support of this claim has been contradictory. We argue that this inconsistency derives from the literature’s assumption that income inequality will adequately reflect the conditions under which demands for radical redistribution will emerge and trigger antidemocratic elite reactions. We argue instead that when developmental context is taken into consideration, absolute forms of distribution, like basic needs deprivation, are better indicators of these conditions. When needs deprivation exists in the face of enhanced economic development, citizens will not only notice deprivation more readily, but also, given the greater social surplus, deem it more unacceptable, provoking radical demands for redistributive justice. This combination of development and continuing basic needs shortfalls, a condition that we refer to as regressive socioeconomic distribution, will threaten democratic survival. Using event history analysis on a sample composed of all democracies from 1961 to 1995, we confirm that regressive socioeconomic distribution increases the risk of breakdown.

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