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Exploring the relationship among rule governance mechanism, project control rights allocation, and project performance in public-private partnership (PPP) projects is of great significance for optimizing control rights allocation and governance mechanism to improve project performance of PPP projects. Previous studies have mainly focused on the impact of contractual governance or rule-based governance on the performance of PPP projects, and the research on the allocation of project control rights into the analysis framework is insufficient. The goal of this study is to explore the moderating effect of the allocation of project control rights on the project’s rule mechanism affecting project performance. Based on the theoretical analysis and literature review, three hypotheses are put forward, and the hypotheses are tested by structural equation model using the large sample data collected by questionnaire survey. This study shows that both the rule governance mechanism and project control right allocation have a positive impact on project performance, and the allocation of project control right has a negative moderating effect on the impact of rule governance mechanism on project performance. The public characteristics of PPP projects determine that it is inappropriate for social capital to have too much project control rights. The degree of project control rights owned by social capital should be balanced with the rule governance in the dynamic management process.

The public housing PPP projects have encountered a cold reception from the government, which constrained solving the urban housing problem. This paper builds a dynamic game model under incomplete contract conditions, analyzes the key factors affecting the signing of PPP contracts by dynamic evolutionary game analysis, and verifies these factors by simulation. The results show that fiscal spending smoothing, risk transfer, and government performance can promote government to adopt cooperation strategy. Expected project benefits and government performance incentives can promote private capital to adopt cooperation strategy. Changes in transaction cost have a significant impact on the decision of cooperation strategy.

In the research of intelligent grids, people usually pay attention to the interaction between power source and load to absorb more new energy. In contrast, the utilization of power source and load on grid resources is less considered, and energy-grid-load is not fully explored. The profound benefits and value of the three interactions. To this end, the paper proposes the interactive mode and method of power supply, power grid, and load based on full-cost electricity price. The power source side needs to consider the impact of transmission costs when optimizing economic dispatch; the load side needs to calculate the full-cost electricity price based on the power flow tracking method, clarify the load’s use of power and grid resources, and reflect the “who benefits, who bears the cost” Principles and introduce demand-side response to reflect the meaning and value of full-cost electricity prices. The research found that the calculation example analysis based on the IEEE30-node system verifies that the method in this paper can reasonably allocate the cost of the power grid according to the user’s utilization of power grid resources, thereby improving the efficiency, fairness, orderliness and safety of power grid investment and operation.

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