Concealed information tests (CITs) are used to determine whether an individual possesses information about an item of interest. Event-related potential (ERP) measures in CITs have focused almost exclusively on the P3b component, showing that this component is larger when lying about the item of interest (probe) than telling the truth about control items (irrelevants). Recent studies have begun to examine other ERP components, such as the anterior N2, with mixed results. A seminal CIT study found that visual probes elicit a larger anterior N2 than irrelevants (Gamer and Berti, 2010) and suggested that this component indexes cognitive control processes engaged when lying about probes. However, this study did not control for potential intrinsic differences among the stimuli: the same probe and irrelevants were used for all participants, and there was no control condition composed of uninformed participants. Here, first we show that the N2 effect found in the study by Gamer and Berti (2010) was in large part due to stimulus differences, as the effect observed in a concealed information condition was comparable to that found in two matched control conditions without any concealed information (Experiments 1 and 2). Next, we addressed the issue of the generality of the N2 findings by counterbalancing a new set of stimuli across participants and by using a control condition with uninformed participants (Experiment 3). Results show that the probe did not elicit a larger anterior N2 than the irrelevants under these controlled conditions. These findings suggest that caution should be taken in using the N2 as an index of concealed information in CITs. Furthermore, they are a reminder that results of CIT studies (not only with ERPs) performed without stimulus counterbalancing and suitable control conditions may be confounded by differential intrinsic properties of the stimuli employed.

During the last decade and a half, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has been used to determine whether it is possible to detect concealed knowledge by examining brain activation patterns, with mixed results. Concealed information tests rely on the logic that a familiar item (probe) elicits a stronger response than unfamiliar, but otherwise comparable items (irrelevants). Previous work has shown that physical countermeasures can artificially modulate neural responses in concealed information tests, decreasing the accuracy of these methods. However, the question remains as to whether purely mental countermeasures, which are much more difficult to detect than physical ones, can also be effective. An fMRI study was conducted to address this question by assessing the effect of attentional countermeasures on the accuracy of the classification between knowledge and no‐knowledge cases using both univariate and multivariate analyses. Results replicate previous work and show reliable group activation differences between the probe and the irrelevants in fronto‐parietal networks. Critically, classification accuracy was generally reduced by the mental countermeasures, but only significantly so with region of interest analyses (both univariate and multivariate). For whole‐brain analyses, classification accuracy was relatively low, but it was not significantly reduced by the countermeasures. These results indicate that mental countermeasure need to be addressed before these paradigms can be used in applied settings and that methods to defeat countermeasures, or at least to detect their use, need to be developed. Highlights FMRI‐based concealed information tests are vulnerable to mental countermeasures Measures based on regions of interest are affected by mental countermeasures Whole‐brain analyses may be more robust than region of interest ones Methods to detect mental countermeasure use are needed for forensic applications

When comparing between the values of different choices, human beings can rely on either more cognitive processes, such as using mathematical computation, or more affective processes, such as using emotion. However, the neural correlates of how these two types of processes operate during value-based decision-making remain unclear. In this study, we investigated the extent to which neural regions engaged during value-based decision-making overlap with those engaged during mathematical and emotional processing in a within-subject manner. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment, participants viewed stimuli that always consisted of numbers and emotional faces that depicted two choices. Across tasks, participants decided between the two choices based on the expected value of the numbers, a mathematical result of the numbers, or the emotional face stimuli. We found that all three tasks commonly involved various cortical areas including frontal, parietal, motor, somatosensory, and visual regions. Critically, the mathematical task shared common areas with the value but not emotion task in bilateral striatum. Although the emotion task overlapped with the value task in parietal, motor, and sensory areas, the mathematical task also evoked responses in other areas within these same cortical structures. Minimal areas were uniquely engaged for the value task apart from the other two tasks. The emotion task elicited a more expansive area of neural activity whereas value and mathematical task responses were in more focal regions. Whole-brain spatial correlation analysis showed that valuative processing engaged functional brain responses more similarly to mathematical processing than emotional processing. While decisions on expected value entail both mathematical and emotional processing regions, mathematical processes have a more prominent contribution particularly in subcortical processes.

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