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This paper tries to elucidate Peirce's notoriously obscure definition of metaphor (CP 2.277) in the context of his general theory of signs. It is argued that Peirce defined metaphor not as a proposition, but as a genuinely original iconic (meta-)sign that represents a novel sign relation and, hence, novel thought. The adequacy of this approach is discussed against the background of rival theories of metaphor. This shows, inter alia, 1) that metaphors can and must be interpreted like ordinary signs (which in particular allows for paraphrases); 2) how they get conventional and how they can be revived; and 3) that they are intrinsically independent of linguistic levels (e.g., words) and media (e.g., natural language). Peirce's theory thus turns out to be a reasonable explanation of a central semiotic phenomenon and, hence, promises to serve as a powerful tool for modern literary and cultural studies.

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