In Brazil and Mexico, presidents failed to take swift, national action to stop the spread of COVID-19. Instead, the burden of imposing and enforcing public health measures has largely fallen to subnational leaders, resulting in varied approaches within each country and conflicting messaging from elites. We likewise see variation in compliance with social distancing across subnational units. To explain this variation, we contend that citizen responses are driven both by the comprehensiveness of state policies and whether they take cues from national or subnational elites. We hypothesize that support for national and subnational elites, and the nature of the state-level policy response, affect citizen compliance with public health guidelines. In both countries, we find that support for the governor has an interactive relationship with policy response. In Brazil, support for the president is associated with lower compliance. In Mexico, this effect is not present. We argue that these distinct relationships are due to the different cues emerging from each leader.

Neopatrimonial exercise of power, combining ruler appropriation of resources with ruler discretionality in the use of state power, remains present to varying degrees in contemporary Latin America. Building on an extensive literature, this article provides a delimited conceptualization and measurement of neopatrimonialism for 18 countries in the region and examines the effects of neopatrimonial legacies on poverty with cross-national quantitative analysis. The study finds that higher levels of neopatrimonialism have a significant, substantive impact on poverty levels, controlling for other relevant demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors. It confirms the importance of a cumulative record of democracy for poverty alleviation, while the analysis indicates that neopatrimonialism limits the effects of the political left in power on poverty reduction.

What role do subnational governments play in shaping a country’s redistributive efforts? Existing literature suggests that federalism can be a hindrance to redistribution. Such negative effects may be particularly true of Latin America’s federations due to high levels of regional inequality and malapportioned political institutions. However, in order to fully understand redistribution in federal systems in Latin America, we need to examine not only how subnational governments affect centralized redistributive efforts, but also what efforts these subnational governments are making themselves. In this article, I contribute to our understanding of subnational social spending in Latin America’s largest federation, Brazil. My results suggest that, in Brazil, state governments are constrained actors, but they do pursue different levels of redistributive social spending with higher levels being more likely under left parties.

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