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Over the past 20 years, there have been significant and historic breakthroughs in resolving protracted ethnic conflicts in restive regions of several states in South and South-East Asia. After decades of violence, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand have all witnessed periods of reduced conflict and increased stability. Peace-building as practiced in these states departs markedly from the liberal and post-liberal models in which Western actors and liberal norms play a key role. Here, by contrast, peace-building is driven by domestic actors applying illiberal norms and practices. In this introductory article, we trace the shift from liberal to postliberal to illiberal peace-building, define illiberal peace-building, discuss the case studies presented in this special issue, and finally draw out common themes and policy implications.

Following atrocities against the minority Muslim Rohingya population by the Myanmar military, several states have imposed sanctions and deployed international justice strategies against the Myanmar government. In contrast, Indonesia has used an alternative ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach, focused on aid delivery to affected communities and cooperation with Myanmar. The paper presents one of the first empirical examinations of Indonesia’s role, and considers Indonesia’s approach from a realpolitik perspective to show why Indonesia has avoided R2P measures. The paper identifies three factors that shaped Indonesia’s approach: Islamic humanitarianism, Indonesia’s own experience of managing civil–military relations during a contested democratic transition, and its continued commitment to core asean principles. The paper also contributes to wider debates by identifying some of the limitations of R2P, especially in terms of how R2P can be sidelined by national and regional diplomatic priorities, in this case manifested in the quiet diplomacy approach.

States undergoing turbulent processes of democratisation frequently use illiberal peacebuilding methods to manage civil wars, as it enables them to secure order with the lowest risk. However, the existing literature on illiberal peace-building does not explain why governments sometimes opt for more liberal means, despite the risks involved. To explore this question, the paper draws on original primary sources and secondary evidence to compare the Indonesian government's management of two civil wars during democratisation. The Papua and East Timor cases constitute an ideal comparative case study as the government took starkly different approaches to managing conflict in each region, within the same period. While East Timor was resolved via liberal methods, the Papua conflict was managed via illiberal means. I argue that two dimensions need greater recognition and interrogation within the existing illiberal peace-building framework to explain this difference: first, the role of shifting internal power balances within national political elites, especially civilian-military relations and the relative power of moderates; and, second, the influence of external actors on these internal power balances.

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