The surprising extended decline in real oil prices during the 1980s has raised the question of OPEC’s continued viability as a price-setting cartel. In response, Griffin’s (1985) tests of alternative hypotheses about OPEC behaviour performed over a period of generally rising prices (1971:1-1983:III) are repeated for the more recent period of falling prices (1983:IV-1988:IV), yielding the same general conclusions: most OPEC members continue to behave in a “partial market sharing” way, while most non-OPEC oil producers do not. Thus the evidence suggests that recent oil price reductions are more the result of deliberate output adjustments by the cartel than the unintentional outcome of a breakdown in cartel discipline on the way to eventual collapse.

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Recently, Greene (1992) analyzed vehicle miles travelled for U.S. passenger vehicles over 1966-89 to econometrically estimate the “rebound” effect in fuel consumption resulting from improved fuel efficiency. He found that a static AR(1) model could not be rejected, implying that the rebound effect is small (13 %) with no significant long-run adjustments, regardless of the assumed functional form (linear or loglinear). Another look at the data from a different model selection approach shows that while a loglinear AR(1) model is acceptable, the linear version is not. Using either form, a lagged dependent variable model cannot be rejected on statistical grounds yet has insignificant GNP effects, yielding similarly small short-run rebound effects but significant long-run rebound effects of about 30%. Thus, the evidence from these competing models for a significant long-run adjustment process is mixed, so that its presence cannot be completely ruled out.

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