The headline claim of this engaging but frustrating book is that important insight is available both into Wittgenstein's work and into its difficulty for us by viewing Wittgenstein as a species of exile. Wittgenstein lived much of his life away from Austria, but this is not what Klagge wants to emphasise. His proposal is that Wittgenstein may fruitfully be considered as having lived in exile not from a homeland but from a 'hometime'-specifically, from a period that ended with the death of Schumann. The possibility of this perspective is provided in the first instance by Wittgenstein's reaction to Spengler's philosophy of history. Spengler found in history a repeated pattern of growth, maturity and decline. The maturity of an era was termed 'culture' and is associated by Spengler with 'organism'; an era's decline is termed 'civilisation' and associated with 'mechanism'. Instantiating this pattern is the Western Era, which moved from culture to decline over the course of the nineteenth century. To an extent, as Klagge shows, Wittgenstein appears to have accepted this narrative. And crucially for Klagge's purposes, Wittgenstein sometimes conceived of himself and of his work as belonging not to his own time of western civilisation but to its preceding period of culture. The details, at least, of Spengler's story are somewhat dubious. When considering Wittgenstein's thought as opposed to his self-conception Klagge therefore soft pedals much of its historical specifics and focuses instead on the story's atemporal characterisations of culture and civilisation. The intellectual spirit of civilisation, exemplified centrally by Socrates, is one

This paper is concerned with the status of a symbol in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. It is claimed in the first section that a Tractarian symbol, whilst essentially a syntactic entity to be distinguished from the mark or sound that is its sign, bears its semantic significance only inessentially. In the second and third sections I pursue this point of exegesis through the Tractarian discussions of nonsense and the context principle respectively. The final section of the paper places the forgoing work in a secondary context, addressing in particular a debate regarding the realism of the Tractatus.

It has been much debated whether the Tractarian objects are what Russell would have called particulars or whether they include also properties and relations. This paper claims that the debate is misguided: there is no logical category such that Wittgenstein intended the reader of the Tractatus to understand his objects either as providing examples of or as not providing examples of that category. This is not to say that Wittgenstein set himself against the very idea of a logical category: quite the contrary. However, where Russell presents his logical variety of particulars and the various types of universal, and Frege presents his of objects and the various types of function, Wittgenstein denies the propriety of such a priori expositions. Wittgenstein envisages a variety of logical types of entity but insists that the nature of these types is something to be discovered only through analysis. This paper begins with a review of a familiar debate whether Tractarian objects are particulars or include also universals. In the second section I abstract from that debate: a proposal is made rather for framing the question of how Tractarian objects are to be placed with the logical ontologies of Frege and Russell. Section three notes some equivalences for that question, so framed, and takes a first look at Wittgenstein's response. Wittgenstein's position is then explored more fully in section four. The penultimate section five draws together the conclusions of sections two through four and compares them with the debate discussed in section one and also with the positions of certain exegetes not party to that debate. Section six deals with some loose ends and makes a quick connection to Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

In “On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood” Russell offers both a multiple-relation theory of judgment and a correspondence theory of truth. It has been a prevailing understanding of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein rejects Russell’s multiple-relation idea but endorses the correspondence theory. Ramsey took the opposite view. In his “Facts and Propositions,” Ramsey endorses Russell’s multiple-relation idea, rejects the correspondence theory, and then asserts that these moves are both due to Wittgenstein. This chapter will argue that Ramsey’s ascriptions are both correct. The extent of the agreement between Ramsey and Wittgenstein moreover counts definitively against standard understandings of Ramsey as a redundancy theorist of truth. Wittgenstein is no correspondence theorist and Ramsey is no redundancy theorist; rather, both philosophers offer identity theories of truth.

The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought's answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory