Recent research has suggested that anxiety may be associated with processing biases that favor the encoding of emotionally threatening information. However, the available data can be accommodated by alternative explanations, including response bias accounts. The current study introduces a novel paradigm that circumvents such interpretative problems by requiring subjects to make a neutral response (button press) to a neutral stimulus (visual dot probe). The position of this dot probe was manipulted on a VDU (visual display unit) screen relative to visually displayed words, which could either be threat related or neutral in content. Probe detection latency data were then used to determine the impact of threat-related stimuli on the distribution of visual attention. Clinically anxious (but not clinically depressed) subjects consistently shifted attention toward threat words, resulting in reduced detection latencies for probes appearing in the vicinity of such stimuli. Normal control subjects, on the other hand, tended to shift attention away from such material. The results were interpreted as supporting the existence of anxiety-related encoding bias, and it is suggested that this cognitive mechanism may contribute to the maintenance of such mood disorders.Recently there has been a great deal of interest in the relation between mood and cognition, with most research focusing on depression. The consistent finding has been that an elevated level of depression leads to a bias in recall, which favors the retrieval of mood-congruent information. Whether the depression is experimentally induced (

Attentional bias is a central feature of many cognitive theories of psychopathology. One of the most frequent methods of investigating such bias has been an emotional analog of the Stroop task. In this task, participants name the colors in which words are printed, and the words vary in their relevance to each theme of psychopathology. The authors review research showing that patients are often slower to name the color of a word associated with concerns relevant to their clinical condition. They address the causes and mechanisms underlying the phenomenon, focusing on J. D. Cohen, K. Dunbar, and J. L. McClelland's (1990) parallel distributed processing model.Anxiety and depressive disorders remain the most common forms of psychopathology and represent a large challenge for psychological analysis and treatment. Although the various forms of emotional disorder differ in many ways, recent cognitive accounts have pointed out how each of them share a common feature: sensitivity to and preoccupation with stimuli in their environment that represent their concern. Central to these cognitive theories of psychopathology is the notion that such preoccupation arises from biases in attention. For example, hypervigilance to cues signaling impending danger from the environment is an important feature of recent models of anxiety (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985), and similar hypersensitivity to bodily sensations has been implicated in panic disorder (Clark, 1988;McNally, 1990). In posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). attention is drawn to stimuli that remind of past trauma and exacerbate the fear of future similar events (Yule, 1991). In depression, the preoccupation is with past losses, the mind being dominated by ruminations such as "1 have lost my friends" and "I'm a failure" (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993).Cognitive models assume that attentional bias is not simply a by-product of the emotional disorder but plays a vital role in its causation and maintenance. It contributes to the vicious cycle, whereby small increases in emotional disturbance result in cer-

A review of recent research on cognitive processing indicates that biases in attention, memory, and interpretation, as well as repetitive negative thoughts, are common across emotional disorders, although they vary in form according to type of disorder. Current cognitive models emphasize specific forms of biased processing, such as variations in the focus of attention or habitual interpretative styles that contribute to the risk of developing particular disorders. As well as predicting risk of emotional disorders, new studies have provided evidence of a causal relationship between processing bias and vulnerability. Beyond merely demonstrating the existence of biased processing, research is thus beginning to explore the cognitive causes of emotional vulnerability, and their modification.

Although it is well-established that vulnerability to negative emotion is associated with attentional bias toward aversive information, the causal basis of this association remains undetermined. Two studies addressed this issue by experimentally inducing differential attentional responses to emotional stimuli using a modified dot probe task, and then examining the impact of such attentional manipulation on subsequent emotional vulnerability. The results supported the hypothesis that the induction of attentional bias should serve to modify emotional vulnerability, as revealed by participants' emotional reactions to a final standardized stress task. These findings provide a sound empirical basis for the previously speculative proposal that attentional bias can causally mediate emotional vulnerability, and they suggest the possibility that cognitive-experimental procedures designed to modify selective information processing may have potential therapeutic value.

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