Medieval thinkers were both puzzled and fascinated by the capacity of human beings to do what is morally wrong. In this book, Colleen McCluskey offers the first comprehensive examination of Thomas Aquinas' explanation for moral wrongdoing. Her discussion takes in Aquinas' theory of human nature and action, and his explanation of wrong action in terms of defects in human capacities including the intellect, the will, and the passions of the sensory appetite. She also looks at the notion of privation, which underlies Aquinas' account of wrongdoing, as well as his theory of the vices, which intersects with his basic account. The result is a thorough exploration of Aquinas' psychology which is both accessible and illuminating, and will be of interest to a wide range of readers in Aquinas studies, medieval philosophy, the history of theology, and the history of ideas.

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is commonly thought to hold that human beings will happiness and do so necessarily. This is taken to mean first that human beings are not able to will misery for the sake of misery and therefore not capable of pursuing misery for its own sake. Secondly, everything that human beings do will they will for the sake of happiness, and since human beings are moved to act on the basis of what they will, all of their actions are performed for the sake of happiness. This claim is subject to doubt because it seems to many to be false on empirical grounds. Often, people choose things that they know and are willing to admit do not make them happy. Often, people choose things without even thinking about their happiness. Aquinas's theory must deal adequately with such apparent counterexamples. But his account faces an objection of a different nature, an objection raised by John Duns Scotus.Scotus argues that a view of happiness such as Aquinas's is contradictory. In this article, I examine Scotus's reasons for this claim. Although I believe that his arguments ultimately fail, I also believe that Aquinas must address the underlying worries that motivate Scotus to raise the objection. Scotus is concerned that if we will happiness necessarily, we would never act freely. This is because Scotus believes that such a view entails a lack of choice on our part. According to Scotus, if we were faced with a choice between what would contribute (or what we think would contribute) to our happiness and what would not so contribute, on Aquinas's view, we would be moved necessarily to choose the former, and the subsequent action would not be free. But without freedom of action, there can be no morality or moral responsibility. I argue that Aquinas can address these worries although his answer will not satisfy Scotus. First, I will explain Aquinas's *I am grateful to Eleonore Stump, James Bohman, Jeffrey Hause, and Jose Medina for their many helpful comments on different versions of this paper. I read versions of this paper at a philosophy colloquium at St. Louis University, at Emory University as the 1998 Aquinas Lecture in Philosophy, and at the 1999 Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association. I wish to thank my audiences at those events, and especially my commentator at the Pacific APA, David P. Hunt, for their engaging discussion.

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